Torts by Stein, Ralph Michael
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace




Pace Law School, rstein@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ralph Michael Stein, Torts, 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 545 (1987), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/274/.
TORTS 
Ralph Michael Stein* 
During the 1986 Survey year, a number of cases of interest to 
practitioners were decided by the courts of New York. There have 
been several new legislative enactments which will also have a di- 
rect impact upon the practice of tort law. These enactments are 
analyzed elsewhere in this Survey volume.' Following past prac- 
tice, cases of the greatest significance will be highlighted, as well as 
those oddities which make tort law a stage for the human comedy. 
A. Introductory Comment 
The medical malpractice problem continues to be viewed as a 
major crisis in the provision of health services. The attendant costs 
of medical malpractice litigation are viewed by many-mostly from 
the doctor and hospital camp-as intolerable. Draconian measures, 
always expressed as "reforms," continue to be proposed. Recent ef- 
forts by the New York State Legislature and Governor Cuomo in 
securing the enactment of a series of substantive-procedural 
changes may temporarily alleviate the situation. Governor Cuomo's 
recent announcement that a lengthy study of malpractice problems 
in New York will soon be undertaken may mean that attorneys, 
health care providers and consumers will benefit from an unbiased 
and unhurried examination of what has become a hyperemotional 
issue.= On the other hand, we may have just one more study which 
breeds estrangement rather than consensus and a commitment to 
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is a co-author 
of the treatise, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Matthew Bender 1984), and frequently lectures 
on medical, psychiatric, and nursing malpractice law. 
1.  See Carlisle, Civil Practice, supra this Survey. 
2. Stories about medical malpractice litigation flood the media and these lawsuits have 
been attributed as a cause to everything from defensive medicine to suicides by doctors. In 
New York State, the high power media blitz campaigns by both the medical and the legal 
professions have, in my view, brought fear and confusion rather than enlightenment to the 
public. 
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both quality health care and due regard for the problem of profes- 
sional incompetence. 
As the continued flow of verdicts for plaintiffs in medical mal- 
practice cases indicate, want of ordinary care by physicians and 
institutional health care providers is neither isolated nor unusual. 
At the same time, the continued ability of numerous defendants to 
prevail a t  trial demonstrates the continuing vitality of the common 
law tradition, the ability of juries to comprehend vast amounts of 
technical and scientific data, and to reach a verdict not dictated by 
plaintiff's injuries alone. 
B. Informed Consent 
This past Survey year was marked by a dearth of noteworthy 
informed consent cases. Hopefully, this is not simply an aberration 
because, as noted in prior articles: there is no segment of the med- 
ical malpractice spectrum more amenable to elimination than the 
cause of action for lack of informed consent.' Perhaps we are now 
seeing the fruits of a trend which began gathering momentum 
three or four years ago whereby physicians increasingly are recog- 
nizing and honoring the patient's right of decision by providing 
relevant and comprehensible information. 
C. Malpractice 
Last year's Survey"iscussed the unusual case of Suria v. 
Shiffman.6 Suria involved a breast augmentation procedure on a 
transsexual patient.' A series of negligent acts by several physi- 
cians were found to have resulted in painful and permanent inju- 
ries to the  lai in tiff.^ During the past year, the Court of Appeals 
a r m e d  the jury verdict for the plaintiff but so modified the judg- 
ment as to relieve one of the defendants, Avtar S. Dhaliwal, of the 
rank of joint tortfeasor and reduce him to the supporting role of 
successive tortfeas~r.~ 
3. See, e.g., Stein, Torts, 1984 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV 595,597 (1985). 
4. See id. 
5. See Stein, Torts, 1985 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE L.REV. 719, 721-22 (1986) 
(analysis of this case at appellate division stage). 
6. 67 N.Y.2d 87, 490 N.E.2d 832, 499 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1986). 
7. See id. at 91-92, 490 N.E.2d at 833, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 914. 
8. See id. at 94-95, 490 N.E.2d at 834, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16. 
9. See id. at 98-99, 490 N.E.2d at 837, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 918. 
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The vicarious liability of a physician who owns a clinic but 
does not control the actions of a treating doctor or participate in 
the treatment process of a patient-turned-plaintiff was analyzed by 
New York's highest court in Hill v. St. Clare's Hospital.lo The 
plaintiff in Hill sustained a work-related injury and was removed 
to St. Clare's Hospital where he was, as the trial court subse- 
quently determined, mistreated." Advised to see a company doc- 
tor, he went to a physician who was practicing in an industrial 
clinic named the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic.lz Dr. Gilbert 
was hors d'combat because of his own medical problems and had 
solicited a friend and colleague, Dr. Bono, to practice under his 
trade name while he was recuperating.ls In fact, Dr. Gilbert "also 
arranged for two secretaries and two physicians . . . formerly with 
Dr. Gilbert to move" to offices which Dr. Gilbert's friend, Dr. Bono 
had leased." "Dr. Gilbert never practiced at  the West 44th Street 
office, however, because the ailment which caused his hospitaliza- 
tion proved fatal."16 The new owner and operator of the Gilbert 
Clinic, Dr. Bono, did not examine or treat Hill.16 Hill, however, 
had used the services of the Gilbert Cliiic in the past.17 He re- 
turned to the facility that had changed location, not an uncommon 
occurrence in Manhattan, but was still operating under the same 
name.18 In apportioning the successive culpability of St. Clare's 
Hospital and Dr. Bono, the trial court found the hospital to be 
liable for thirty percent of plaintiffs harm while the non-treating 
physician, Dr. Bono, was found responsible for seventy percent.lS 
The key question in this case was the existence of liability on 
the part of a physician who, in a proprietary sense, owns a medical 
clinic open to the general public but who did not in any way par- 
ticipate in the treatment of a patienL20 Writing for the Court, 
Judge Meyer first squarely found: 
10. 67 N.Y.2d 72, 490 N.E.2d 823, 499 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1986). 
11. See id. at 78, 490 N.E.2d at 825, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. Dr. Gilbert apparently fully intended to resume practice under his own 
name after recovering. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. at 76, 490 N.E.2d at 825, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 78, 490 N.E.2d at 826, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 907. 
20. See id. at 79, 490 N.E.2d at 827, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 908. 
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[Tlhat a physician who owns a medical clinic which is held out to 
the public as offering medical services may be held vicariously lia- 
ble for the malpractice of a treating doctor even though the 
owner-physician neither participates in nor controls the diagnosis 
made or treatment pre~cribed.~' 
Judge Meyer provided a succinct discussion of institutional liabil- 
ity for independent physicians practicing within a hospital.22 He 
noted the general rule that, absent special factors, a hospital is 
generally not responsible for the acts of independent physicians 
who maintain privileges at  the hospital.2s 
In the present case, Judge Meyer noted that Dr. Bono ac- 
knowledged ownership of the clinic and that medical reports to the 
Workers' Compensation Board were signed by Bono with the forms 
provided by Bono listing the clinic as the business entity.%' It is 
also clear that while Dr. Bono did not participate in any way in the 
mistreatment of the plaintiff, he did exercise considerable control 
over both the clinic and the physician who diagnosed and treated 
Hill.2s Fees for clinic patients, as distinct from personal patients of 
the other two doctors, were set by Dr. B o n ~ . " ~ ~  It also appears that 
this was a "mixed" practice with private patients of the individual 
doctors mingling in the waiting room with patients such as the 
plaintiff who were seeking the attention of a clinic phy~ician.~~ Of- 
fice hours were divided among the three doctors whose names, to- 
gether with the name of the clinic, were on its do0r.5~ If a patient 
wished to see a particular doctor, he or she would have to make an 
21. Id. a t  75, 490 N.E.2d a t  824,499 N.Y.S.2d a t  906. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. a t  79,490 N.E.2d a t  827,499 N.Y.S.2d a t  908. The degree of involvement by 
a hospital with an independent physician is a key point. Generally, a hospital that is not 
involved in the medical aspects of treating a patient will not be liable if those medical as- 
pects of care reflect malpractice. To the extent that a hospital recommends or endorses a 
physician beyond the mere granting of privileges, liability is a distinct possibility. In the 
Hill situation, the doctor who treated the plaintiff, Dr. Carranza, filled two roles within the 
clinic. He shared space with others so that he could conduct his private practice and he was 
subordinate to the direction of Dr. Bono for that part of the office's practice that dealt with 
patients seeking the services of the clinic. Determining the role being performed is vital 
because Dr. Bono could not be held accountable for Dr. Carranza's malpractice in treating 
his own, private patients. See id. 
24. See id. a t  81-82, 490 N.E.2d a t  828-29, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  909-10. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. a t  82, 490 N.E.2d a t  829, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  910. 
27. See id. a t  81-82, 490 N.E.2d a t  828-29, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  909-10. 
28. See id. a t  82, 490 N.E.2d a t  829, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  910. 
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appointment; if no specific doctor was requested, the patient would 
be seen by the physician in attendance when the patient arrived.pS 
On that basis, despite some contradictory evidence, Judge 
Meyer found: 
[Tlhere was evidence from which the jury could find that Dr. 
Bono owned the clinic and that plaintiff accepted Dr. Carranza's 
services in reliance not upon Dr. Carranza's skill or competence 
but upon the fact that his services, whatever in fact his relation- 
ship with the clinic, were offered by the clinic.s0 
The situation in Hill v. St. Clare's Hospital merits attention 
from the plaintiffs' bar at a time when the private practice of 
medicine is frequently offered in the form of so-called "proprietary 
 clinic^."^^ While Dr. Bono's non-involvement in the diagnosis and 
treatment of Hill is apparent, this case suggests the importance of 
determining, in as timely a manner as possible, the respective roles 
and responsibilities of all physicians working in the "clinical" set- 
ting. The Court of Appeals has demonstrated that mere non-in- 
volvement with a semi-independent contracting physician, with re- 
gard to the treatment of a plaintiff, will not relieve the owner of a 
clinic from liability for malpractice. 
A New York court also ruled on an action involving the state's 
Good Samaritan Law. This type of complaint, brought relatively 
infrequently against a physician-defendant was dismissed in Rodri- 
guez v. New York City Health & H o ~ p i t a l s . ~ ~  The defendant, with 
fifty-five years of medical practice, was entering his building when 
the building superintendent's wife asked him to examine her ill 
husband.ss Apparently, one look sufficed to apprise the defendant 
of the fact that the building would soon need a new superintendent 
and he told the wife that he could not help her husband whose 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. Certainly the term "clinic" is used increasingly in a nontraditional sense by lawyers 
as well as by physicians. It appears that many of these clinics are staffed by doctors with 
relatively slight assets yet they are not clearly employees so as to allow the almost automatic 
invocation of the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is, of course, a difference between 
an association of physicians sharing facilities, the true master-servent relationship, and the 
slightly opaque arrangement reflected by Hill and, probably, by many similar practices 
throughout the state. 
32. 132 Misc. 2d 705, 505 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1986). 
33. See id. at 706, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 346. 
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"sole, slim chance for survival lay in immediate hospitalizati~n."~' 
The doctor then called the police to request an ambulance and 
lefts6 
The court noted that the actions of the veteran physician did 
not constitute ordinary negligence, much less gross negligence 
which is needed to offset the requirements of the Good Samaritan 
This action against the physician is precisely the kind of 
needless, unethical litigation which the medical profession incor- 
rectly believes forms the mainstay of malpractice trial lawyers. 
There was simply no basis for including the physician-defendant in 
this lawsuit. 
There is currently great concern over communicable diseases 
and the issue of the legal duty of doctors and hospitals to warn 
potential victims of diseases has been examined in a number of 
cases. Understandably, the families of health care providers are 
both concerned and at  risk. In Knier v. Albany Medical Center 
Hosp.,S7 Justice Hughes granted the defendant's motion for sum- 
mary judgment in an action brought by the spouse and children of 
a nurse who had contracted scabies from a patient.s8 The nurse's 
husband and two children subsequently also contracted scabies.ss 
While the plaintiffs alleged that the hospital had failed to fol- 
low its patient care procedures, Justice Hughes noted that 
"[platient care procedures are not designed to protect the stafPs 
family members or friends."'O Although there appeared to be some 
34. See id. There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that any physician could have 
rendered any meaningful medical help by remaining on the scene. See generally id. 
35. See id. 
36. The state's Good Samaritan Law, Public Health Law section 3000-a provides, in 
relevant part: 
Any person who voluntarily and without expectation of monetary compensation 
renders first aid or emergency treatment a t  the scene of an accident or other emer- 
gency outside a hospital, doctor's office or any other place having proper and neces- 
sary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill, or injured, shall not be 
liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for 
damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act 
or omission in the rendering of such emergency treatment unless it is established 
that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of 
such person. 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 3 3000-a (McKiney 1985). 
37. 131 Misc. 2d 414, 500 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1986). 
38. See id. a t  414, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t  491. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. a t  415, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t  491. 
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issue as to whether plaintiff Knier and the nurse were legally mar- 
ried, the real issue in this case was the scope of the zone-of-danger, 
inherently a policy decision.'l The court refused to impose a duty 
upon the hospital to warn the general public that one of its staff 
members had been exposed to an infectious disease.'* It found that 
such a requirement would be impractical and would unduly extend 
the responsibility and liability of health care  institution^.'^ For ex- 
ample, how would a defendant meet a duty to warn all residents 
within the local metropolitan area that one of its employees had 
been exposed to scabies?" 
While the disposition of this case is correct, the analysis can 
be drawn more narrowly. First, there ought to be recognition of 
nurse Mary Ann Warner's degree of expert knowledge as to the 
likelihood of an infectious disease in a patient for whom she was 
caring, her ability to ascertain the actual diagnosis, and her own 
duty-legal and moral-to convey information about exposure to 
an infectious disease to family members and friends. Second, the 
court should have examined the nature of the particular infectious 
disease with a duty analysis to reflect the likelihood of cross-infec- 
tion and the severity of resultant morbidity in exposed persons. 
Scabies is not a common cold, but neither is it  a massively lethal 
disease such as Marburg Fever. An argument can be made that a 
duty to warn identifiable possible victims, as opposed to everyone 
living in Albany, can be made where the disease vector is poten- 
tially lethal. At the least, due care may require a showing that the 
hospital attempted to convey the reality of the situation to the ex- 
posed employee. 
Failure to diagnose, and especially failure to diagnose cancer, 
is a leading source of plaintiff success in medical malpractice ac- 
tions. In Talmatch v. Samet,'6 Justice McCafFrey dealt with a pro- 
cedural matter with underlying substantive ~ignificance.'~ A plain- 
tiff sought to amend a complaint to include an action for wrongful 
death based upon certain information contained in a death certifi- 
41. See id. The sure clue is the reliance of the court on Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See Kiner, 131 Misc. 2d at 415,500 N.Y.S.2d at 491. 
42. See id. at 416, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 492. 
43. See id. at 415-16, 500 N.Y,S.Bd at 491-92. 
44. See id. at 416, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 492. 
45. , Misc. 2d -, 504 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1986). 
46. See id. 
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cate.'? The death certificate indicated that the cause of death was 
metastatic cancer from an original lung car~inorna.'~ The plaintiff 
relied on Rosenberg v. New York University Ho~pi ta l '~  for her 
contention that the death certificate in itself, without a physician's 
statement of merits, was sufXcient to allege a cause of action.50 
Justice McCafFrey refused to apply Rosenberg, and found that the 
required affidavit of merits must be made by a physician and must 
establish a causal connection between the alleged malpractice and 
the new cause of action to be pleaded."l This information is not 
contained in a certificate of death.62 
Justice McCaffrey has applied the logical interpretation. The 
public policy of the state is to attempt to eliminate frivolous and 
poorly founded medical malpractice suits by demanding a physi- 
cian's examination of the alleged merits of a potential case. When 
such an examination is made, the physician asked to provide the 
certificate is aware of the significance of her role. Death certifi- 
cates, on the other hand, are often based on quick clinical impres- 
sions by a doctor who is no longer concerned with the care of the 
patient. The death certificate, in non-suspicious cases, is often 
viewed as a ritual, closeout requirement rather than a time for re- 
flective analysis. To allow the death certificate to supplant the cer- 
tificate of merits would be counterproductive. 
Two actions involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor merit 
brief attention. In Schoch v. D~ugherty ,"~ the Appellate Division, 
Third Department, found that a res ipsa loquitor charge to the 
jury was unwarranted where the plaintiff had undergone two, sepa- 
rate surgical procedures on his knee.64 It found that the question of 
lack of due care was dependent on expert testimony as opposed to 
lay analysis.55 
47. See id. a t  -, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  998. 
48. See id. 
49. 128 Misc. 2d 90, 488 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985). 
50. See Talmatch, - Misc. 2d a t  - 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  998. 
51. See id. a t  -, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  999. 
52. See id. 
53. 122 A.D.2d 467, 504 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1986). 
54. See id. a t  469, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  857. 
55. See id. The court stated: 
Our review of the record confirms that this is not a case in which such an inference 
could have been made . . . . [Tlhe injury here did not occur in an area remote from 
the operative site, but occurred during an intricate part of the surgical procedure 
when the nerve was retracted to allow access . . . . Whether the resulting injury 
Heinonline - -  38 Syracuse L. Rev. 552 1987-1988 
19871 Torts 553 
In Gravitt u. Ne~rnan,~"  the Appellate Division, Second De- 
partment, found that the plaintiff had laid a proper evidentiary 
foundation so as to allow invocation of res ipsa l o q ~ i t o r . ~ ~  Unlike 
the medically complex case of Schoch v. Do~gher ty :~  this case in- 
volved the more simple problem of surgical equipment left inside 
the patient." This case provides an excellent model for demon- 
strating the utilization of res ipsa loquitor in a medical malprac- 
tice setting. 
An interesting medical malpractice case with first amendment 
free exercise of religion dimensions was decided by the Appellate 
Division, First Department. In Randolph v. City of New York,BO 
plaintiffs decedent, an obese woman of forty-five, was pregnant 
and a caesarean section was necessary."l A condition involving her 
just-delievered baby's placenta necessitated the surgical proce- 
dure."' During the procedure, the patient began massively hemor- 
rhaging due to a surgical l ace ra t i~n .~~  Although immediate transfu- 
sions were medically indicated, the patient had previously 
"competently and unequivocally advised the defendant doctor 
that, in view of the fact that she was a Jehovah's Witness, blood 
transfusions were not to be administered to her under any 
circ~mstances."~~ 
Despite the hemorrhaging, the treating physician honored the 
patient's religious objections and attempted to use substitutes for 
whole blood.66 As the situation worsened, a physician secured tele- 
phonic authorization for transfusions and the process was begun 
constituted a deviation from accepted medical practice is surely not a matter within 
the competence of laymen to evaluate, but necessitated expert testimony to estab- 
lish a prima facie case. 
Id. 
56. 114 A.D.2d 1000,495 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1985). 
57. See id. a t  1000-01, 495 N.Y.S.2d a t  440. 
58. 122 A.D.2d 467, 504 N.Y.S.2d 855. 
59. See Gravitt, 114 A.D.2d a t  1000, 495 N.Y.S.2d a t  440. 
60. 117 A.D.2d 44, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1986). 
61. See id. a t  46-47, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  839. 
62. See id. a t  47, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  839. 
63. See id. If the laceration was, of itself, severe enough to cause death and if the lacer- 
ation was inflicted through negligence, a cause of action might have been maintainable with- 
out reference to the blood transfusion issue. See id. 
64. See id. a t  46, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  838. 
65. See id. a t  47, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  839. The treating physician attempted to maintain 
Mrs. Randolph's fluid volume by administering a fluid substitute. See id. 
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but failed.66 
Justice Ross' opinion for the majority deals extensively with 
the complex issues raised by this case.67 Factual issues tried in- 
cluded the question of whether any defendant's negligence caused 
the decedent to be placed in mortal peril.'js There was also evi- 
dence that a t  the time the transfusion process was initiated, it was 
too late to prevent the patient's death.Bs 
The court noted the importance of upholding an individual's 
right to withhold consent for medical care forbidden by the weight 
of religious  conviction^.^^ As there was no doubt that Mrs. Ran- 
dolph was competent when she conveyed her wishes concerning 
blood transfusions, it is clear "that the defendants would not have 
been liable, if Dr. Foster had not undertaken to transfuse Mrs. 
Randolph, because he would have been merely following her 
wishes."?l The respondent raised the novel and untenable argu- 
ment that medical practitioners have a duty to ignore religious 
convictions and provide blood transfusions if they are aware that 
the death of the patient will leave the patient's children with inad- 
equate  upp port.?^ 
The First Department, in reversing the verdict for the plain- 
tiff, found that the trial court had erred in determining that a suf- 
ficient basis had been laid to connect alleged negligence in the 
transfusion process with the actual cause of Mrs. Randolph's 
death.7s In reality, what concerned the majority was not the usual 
analytic problem of proximate cause but the underlying dilemma 
of the physician who does not practice according to the appropri- 
ate degree of care because he attempts to respect the religious 
wishes of a patient.?' 
66. See id. at 47-48, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40. 
67. See id. at 47, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 839. 
68. See id. at 48-49, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 840. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at 49-50, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841. 
71. See id. at 49, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 840. 
72. See id. at 50, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841. Acceptance of such a position would allow only 
the single person to refuse medical care based on religious objections. 
73. See id. 
74. See generally id. at 50-51, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42. Justice Ross stated: 
To this writer, to require a physician to stand by helplessly, while a patient is dying, 
and, when it is too late to save the patient, the doctor is instructed to proceed to 
use his skills to save her, and, to then attempt to apply liability for his actions, is 
just unacceptable. 
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Justice Ellerin's dissent took issue with the majority's analysis 
of the weight of the evidence concerning the possibility of saving 
Mrs. Randolph at  several stages during her critical and final ill- 
ne~s . ?~  Basing his opinion on the general doctrine that reversal of a 
jury verdict should be a highly limited option for an appellate 
court, the dissenting justice believed that there was sufficient evi- 
dence in the record to allow a jury to find that Mrs. Randolph's 
condition had not become irreversible until shortly before her 
death.76 
The court did not comment on the process by which a munici- 
pal attorney may authorize transfusions while a patient is insen- 
sate.77 While the majority strongly reafErms New York's statutory 
and decisional policy recognizing a competent adult's right to re- 
fuse lifesaving treatment, had Mrs. Randolph been saved by the 
transfusions she would have emerged from her brush with death 
with her deepest religious principles violated and no available cog- 
nizable redress for her injury. The opinion in Randolph pays lip 
service to the right of a patient to refuse care but apparently only 
insures that a competent adult who rejects blood transfusions will 
not have the process imposed when helshe is suffering from a con- 
dition for which there is no medical need to transfuse. Law and 
reality ought to be made congruent in this sensitive area. A compe- 
tent, clearly articulated rejection of blood transfusions-or rejec- 
tion of any other kind of medical care-should be respected at  the 
very moment when the patient is least able to r e a r m  the prior 
declaration. 
In Cocomello v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,?s dis- 
puted testimony over what a physician may or may not have said 
to reassure a parent was the foundation of a claim of a missed ap- 
pendicitis diagnosi~.?~ The Appellate Division, First Department, 
found, however, that a statement made to the mother, by one of 
the defendant physicians, advising her to bring her child to an- 
other doctor better qualified to treat the child, coupled with the 
mother's compliance with that recommendation, failed to raise any 
Id. at 52, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 843. 
75. See id. at 53-56, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 843-45 (Ellerin, J., dissenting). 
76. See id. at 55-57, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46. 
77. See id. 
78. 120 A.D.2d 357, 502 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't 1986). 
79. See id. 
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material fact issue as to the liability of that phys i~ ian .~~ While the 
court found the alleged reassurance to be inconsistent with the ad- 
vice to obtain assistance from another doctor, it is clear that reas- 
suring words to a parent coupled with straight advice do not add 
up to a colorable basis for a cause of action.s1 
Reversing a judgment for an infant plaintiff in Kenigsberg v. 
C ~ h n , ~ ~  the Appellate Division, Second Department, dealt with the 
nemesis of organized medicine's campaign against what it invaria- 
bly terms "the Malpractice C r i s i ~ . " ~ ~  In Kenigsberg, a fifteen- 
month-old baby girl sustained severe burns.s4 A skin graft was sub- 
sequently performed by the defendant do~tor.~"'No claim of mal- 
practice was made with respect to treatment of the burn wound 
itself."8s The plaintiff sought to prevail at  trial by showing that a 
better result would have been obtained at  a specialized burn care 
fa~ility.~' NO evidence suggested that the defendant in any way at- 
tempted to prevent or obstruct transfer of the patient to such a 
facility nor was there evidence that the type of skin graft which he 
performed was beyond the scope of his practice.8s 
This is a prototypical "bad results" case in that the true gra- 
vamen of the plaintiff is the reality of the inequality of health care 
services. Certainly some facilities have higher success rates than 
others and this is especially true in extremely difficult services 
such as burn care where only a handful of facilities develop the 
80. See id. a t  357-58, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  10. 
81. See generally id. a t  357-58, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  10. 
82. 117 A.D.2d 652, 498 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1986). 
83. See id. a t  652, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  391. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. Id. a t  653,498 N.Y.S.2d a t  391. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant's lia- 
bility was predicted on his refusal to facilitate the planned transfer of the child by certifying 
that the care required by the child could not be obtained in the institution where the de- 
fendant practiced. See id. The court noted that because there was no basis for suggesting 
that, in fact, adequate care could not be obtained a t  the original treating facility, liability 
could not be predicted on the defendant's refusal to give a false answer. See id. at 653-54, 
498 N.Y.S.2d a t  391. 
87. See id. a t  653, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  391. 
88. See id. The appellate panel noted: 
Given that there was no testimony that the skin graft procedure would have been 
done any differently a t  Cornell, such testimony falls far short of the necessary 
threshold showing for proximate cause, viz., that the conduct depriving the infant 
plaintiff of a better chance of success more probably than not resulted in her injury. 
Id. a t  653-54, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  391. 
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needed expertise. This reality of life cannot be reduced to an con- 
cept of liability. 
D. Birth-related Negligence 
Medical malpractice cases related to obstetrical and neonatal 
care are often unusually difficult from a technical viewpoint. From 
the plaintiffs' perspective, such actions mirror extreme emotional 
responses to the loss of a pregnancy or the birth of a deformed 
child. Throughout the United States, plaintiffs' counsel have been 
trying to enlarge the scope of such malpractice actions and hardly 
a Survey year passes without at least a few relevant cases in our 
own state. 
Two Appellate Division, Second Department, cases merit brief 
consideration. In Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside,B9 the 
court, in a memorandum opinion, reversed a finding for the plain- 
tiff for emotional injuries caused by negligent advice which had 
persuaded the plaintiff patient to obtain an abortion.g0 Citing con- 
trolling law in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
the majority found that "[nlo cause of action exists to recover 
solely upon a claim of emotional injuries suffered by a mother as 
the result of physical harm done to her child in ~tero."~' 
Noting that "[tlhis case is as simple as it  is tragic,"92 Justice 
Gibbons penned a thoughtful dissent which argued that Martinez 
is clearly distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the major- 
 it^.^^ In this case, Mrs. Martinez was advised to obtain an abortion 
because the defendant had erroneously miscalculated the quantity 
of a drug she had taken during pregnan~y.~' The amount calcu- 
lated by the defendant would almost certainly have resulted in a 
deformed child while the actual amount ingested was unlikely to 
have had any significant effect on normal fetal devel~prnent.~~ Jus-
tice Gibbons noted: 
89. 122 A.D.2d 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1986). 
90. See id. at 122-24,504 N.Y.S.2d at 693-94. This case is made more tragic by the fact 
that the plaintiff had to overcome her own religious beliefs in order to undergo an abortion. 
See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 694. 
91. See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 693. 
92. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
93. See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 694. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
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Thus, it is apparent that Mrs. Martinez was not injured as a re- 
sult of physical harm done to her child in utero, but, rather, was 
injured upon being misinformed that her fetus was hopelessly 
malformed and that an abortion was necessary . . . . Her injury 
was later compounded upon learning of the appellant's tragic er- 
ror after she had aborted the healthy fetus." 
Justice Gibbons' analysis is persuasive. Martinez is much 
more akin to the emotional distress cause of action based on a 
faulty diagnosis, such as of cancer, than it is to the cases cited by 
the majority where the fetus was harmed directly and the pregnant 
woman suffered emotional harm. 
In the delivery of a baby, obstetrical and pediatric functions 
are closely entwined. Whether a pediatrician's negligence, following 
an obstetrician's departure from a reasonable standard of care, 
constitutes successive or joint negligence was before the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, in Ravo v. R o g a t n i ~ k . ~ ~  To avoid 
joint and several liability, the pediatrician claimed that his negli- 
gence was independent of the  obstetrician'^.^^ The court noted: 
The evidence shows . . . that after a difficult delivery involving 
brain damage, which was determined by the jury to have involved 
negligence on the part of the obstetrician, the infant plaintiff had 
a very high bilirubin and hematocrit level, both known to indicate 
conditions which cause brain damage. Harris' [the pediatrician] 
negligence was the failure to act promptly with respect to the in- 
fant plaintws condition existing a t  birth and for some time 
thereafter which indicated that severe brain damage was 
impli~ated.~~ 
A finding of joint and several liability was correct because there 
was no testimony which would have allowed a jury to apportion 
the injury.loO 
It is clear that causes of action based on the inevitable emo- 
tional distress consequent to medical malpractice where the only 
palpable harm to the pregnant woman is the loss of the fetus, or 
deformation of the fetus, continue not to be recognized in New 
96. Id. 
97. 122 A.D.2d 705, 503 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1986). 
98. See id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 891. 
99. Id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92. 
100. See id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 892. 
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E. Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions 
As always, in negligence law in general, and medical malprac- 
tice cases in particular, a number of verdicts were set aside as ex- 
cessive.lo2 The opinions sustaining or directing the reduction of 
verdicts in medical malpractice cases did not provide any new 
analyses during the past year. 
F. Miscellaneous Malpractice Cases 
In Landon by Landon v. New York Hospital,lo3 the Court of 
Appeals, without opinion, affirmed the appellate division's dismis- 
sal of the plaintiffs' emotional distress claims.lo4 The plaintiffs, 
whose child was deteriorating from bacterial meningitis, claimed 
emotional harm from observing the child's grave condition while 
also experiencing fears of contracting the disease themselves.lo6 
The dissent viewed the relationship between treating physi- 
cians and the parents of an ill child as creating a duty running to 
the parents to provide accurate and reasonable informati~n. '~~ 
"Since there exists a direct duty to the parents independent of 
that owed by the physicians to the child, appellant's cause of ac- 
tion seeking damages for emotional harm is cognizable at law."lo7 
If viewed on an independent duty basis, for which the dissent 
claimed there was authority,'08 the parents should have been per- 
mitted to attempt to prove their cause of action. 
101. See, e.g., Wittrock v. Maimonidies Medical Center-Maimonidies Hosp., 119 A.D.2d 
748, 501 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2d Dep't 1986) (no recovery for both the emotional and physical 
harm resulting from a still birth); Gastwirth v. Rosenberg, 117 A.D.2d 706,499 N.Y.S.2d 95 
(2d Dep't 1986) (no recovery for emotional harm caused by malpractice resulting in in utero 
death); Mc Bride v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical, 130 Misc. 2d 999,498 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct., 
Kings Co. 1986) (recovery for malpractice to mother for emotional distress distinct from 
recovery for distress linked to loss of fetus). 
102. See Vialva v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 701,499 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1986) 
(excessive pain and suffering award); Trocchia v. Long Island College Hosp., 122 A.D.2d 626, 
503 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1986) (trial court erred in finding jury verdict inadequate). 
103. 65 N.Y.2d 639, 481 N.E.2d 239, 491 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1985). 
104. See id. a t  640, 481 N.E.2d a t  239,491 N.Y.S.2d a t  607. 
105. See id. a t  639-40,481 N.E.2d a t  239, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  607. 
106. See id. a t  640-41,481 N.E.2d a t  239-40,491 N.Y.S.2d a t  608 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
107. See id. a t  641, 481 N.E.2d a t  240, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  608. 
108. See id. a t  641-42, 481 N.E.2d a t  240-41, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  608-09. 
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Query: why are there so few reported legal malpractice cases? 
Are they settled prior to trial? Before verdict? After judgment is 
entered? There must be a reason why the malpractice insurance 
rates of most New York attorneys, while they are in no way compa- 
rable to those of physicians, continue to climb. 
The Appellate Division, Second Department, decided two legal 
malpractice cases during the Survey year, neither of earthshaking 
importance. In Green v. Leibowitz,'OS both fraud and legal mal- 
practice were alleged.l1° The plaintiff essentially sought damages 
for emotional distress and claimed that intentional misrepresenta- 
tion by the plaintws former attorney in his handling of a disabil- 
ity claim constituted intentional infliction of mental distress."' 
The Secord Department disagreed, finding that the plaintiff failed 
to allege a prima facie cause of action for intentional infliction of 
mental distress and that psychic injury could not be claimed in 
legal malpractice and fraud causes of action.'le 
A significant percentage of legal malpractice actions arise from 
the failure of counsel to initiate litigation within the requisite stat- 
ute of limitations. The question of what damages are recoverable 
in such an event is fairly well settled, but questions continue to 
arise. In Chiafi u. Wexler, Bergerman & Cru~et , "~  the court 
stated the prevailing American rule that "[tlhe determination of 
an award of damages requires plaintiffs to establish the injuries 
suffered and their value . . . . Therefore, in a legal malpractice ac- 
tion, the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment against the un- 
derlying tortfeasor is a factor to be considered by the trier of 
facts."lr4 
Perhaps this rule, not illogical in itself, helps to explain the 
dearth of legal malpractice actions. Unlike medical malpractice 
suits, legal malpractice actions which are based on alleged failure 
to comply with statute of limitations requirements result in a trial- 
within-a-trial. The merits of the plaintiffs lost cause of action 
must be assessed but without the discovery, witnesses and evi- 
109. 118 A.D.2d 756, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986). 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 756-57, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146-47. 
112. See id. at 758, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 149. 
113. 116 A.D.2d 614, 497 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1986). 
114. See id. at 615, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 704. 
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dence which would have been part of the original action. A legal 
malpractice action is risky because few negligence or contract ac- 
tions begin with a plaintiffs certitude of victory. While it is doubt- 
ful that the bar benefits from this situation, individual attorneys 
who have failed to file an action within the applicable statutory 
period assuredly do. The courts should develop a theory of an ini- 
tial presumption of minimal damages because of counsel's negli- 
gence in failing to initiate litigation. Such a development may well 
act as a deterrent to such negligence. The present doctrine cer- 
tainly does not. 
IV. NEGLIGENCE 
No major doctrinal developments in the general substantive 
law of negligence emerged during the Survey year. A number of 
decisions are of interest as they reflect the courts' continuing at- 
tempts to resolve the numerous, and occasionally novel, injury-pro- 
ducing civil disputes which occupy so much court time. 
In Panzer v. Harding,l16 the Appellate Division, Second De- 
partment, a r m e d  a rare jury verdict for dog owners whose animal 
had bitten a child.l16 The dog in question had a clean record and 
was a known friend of children."' For years, cases involving dogs 
who bite little children had been decided functionally, if not doc- 
trinally, on the basis of strict liability. Panzer has given hope for a 
reversal of this trend. 
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural Historylls is a rare 
case in which both the appellate division and Court of Appeals de- 
cisions were reported within the same Survey year.ll* This was a 
slip and fall case in which the plaintiff sustained injuries on the 
front entrance steps of a museum.120 He claimed that he saw a 
piece of "white, waxy paper"121 while he was in midair.122 The First 
Department sustained an entry of judgment against the defendant, 
115. 118 A.D.2d 842, 500 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1986). 
116. See id. at 843, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 329. 
117. See id. 
118. 67 N.Y.2d 836, 492 N.E.2d 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1986). 
119. See id. at 837, 492 N.E.2d at 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 646. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
Heinonline - -  38 Syracuse L. Rev. 561 1987-1988 
562 Syracuse Law Review [vol. 38545 
but the Court of Appeals reversed in a memorandum opinion.la8 
The Court noted: 
There is no evidence in the record that defendant had actual no- 
tice of the paper and the case should not have gone to the jury on 
that theory. To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be 
visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of 
time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to dis- 
cover and remedy it.lP4 
Recalling to mind classic cases involving the pigmentation of 
banana skins, the Court found that the plaintiff did not even de- 
scribe the paper as dirty, thus failing to establish a minimum basis 
for alleging neglect in not policing the area.136 
Reaching the Court of Appeals was Strauss v. Belle Realty 
Co.,la6 a case arising out of in New York's second great blackout, 
the July 13, 1977 adventure in neighborliness and looting.la7 The 
plaintiff-tenant had sustained personal injuries during the black- 
out while traversing a common area of his apartment b~ilding.''~ 
The appellate division dismissed the complaint and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.laS Justice Kaye, writing for the Court, found that 
liability, following a cataclysmic event such as a citywide power 
123. See id. a t  838,492 N.E.2d a t  775, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  647. 
124. Id. (citations omitted). 
125. Even if the paper had been diiy,  a reasonable standard of care for a museum, 
attracting thousands of persons a day with its approaches besieged by vendors of every type 
offering food and trinkets, cannot posaibly maintain steps clear of slips of paper. There is a 
difference between the museum's setting and the indoor setting where failure to reasonably 
police the premises may be the basis for a successful slip and fall judgment for the plaintiff. 
See Rabiiowitz v. New York Tel. Co., 119 A.D.2d 741,501 N.Y.S 2d 152 (2d Dep't 1986). In 
thii case the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a jury verdict of over 
$112,000 entered for a p la in t s  who suffered a severe neck injury when, while using a public 
telephone owned by the defendant, he turned and was cut in the neck by a sharp metal 
telephone cord. See id. a t  741, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  153. The court found that the judgment 
could not be sustained because of the total lack of proof that any notice, actual or construc- 
tive, about the condition of the phone booth, was made to the phone company. See id. a t  
742, 501 N.Y.S 2d a t  153. The issue of demonstrating not only control but awareneee of a 
defect is vital in establishing a prima facie negligence case where the defendant is reeponsi- 
ble for the condition of either equipment or premises visited by large numbers of un- 
supervised people who actually create the hazardous conditions which cause injury. In many 
instances, the defendant can be shown to have had actual or constructive notice, but thii 
information is rarely volunteered. Aggressive and effective discovery is essential. 
126. 65 N.Y.2d 399,482 N.E.2d 34,492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985). 
127. See id. a t  401, 482 N.E.2d a t  35,492 N.Y.S.2d a t  556. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. a t  405, 482 N.E.2d a t  38,492 N.Y.S.2d a t  559. 
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outage, "should, as a matter of public policy, be limited by the 
contractual relationship."lgO Justice Kaye seemed to be especially 
concerned with the implications of recognizing tort liability in this 
type of situation because of the logical likelihood that the potential 
group of plaintiffs would grow to include customers of stores and 
social guests.lgl 
In an excellent and well-reasoned dissent, Justice Meyer found 
the majority's approach to be one-sided and inadequate for the 
problem presented.lg2 Creatively citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Uni- 
versity of California,lgS a case creating an unrelated doctrine which 
has not been accepted in New York, Justice Meyer demonstrated 
that there exists extensive criteria for analyzing the duty issue 
raised by Consolidated Edison's clear and gross negligence in as- 
suring a blackout of monstrous proportions.lg4 Of equal impor- 
tance, Justice Meyer rejected the protectionist stance adopted by 
the majority which maintained that the public cannot afford to 
have Consolidated Edison held accountable for its negligence on a 
grand scale because the utility might succumb to litigation and 
judgments.1s6 
The responsibility of a driver who is speeding and is involved 
in an accident caused by another driver crops up occasionally in 
both the criminal and tort law fields. The key to securing a judg- 
ment against such a driver lies in demonstrating that he or she was 
acting in concert with the injury-producing tortfeasor rather than 
simply acting irresponsibly alone. In Shea v. Kelly,lS6 the Appel- 
late Division, Second Department, reversed a verdict against a 
130. Id. a t  401, 482 N.E.2d a t  35, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t  556. 
131. See id. a t  405, 482 N.E.2d a t  38, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t  559. 
132. See id. (Meyers, J., dissenting). 
133. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
134. See Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d a t  407-08, 482 N.E.2d a t  39-40, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t  560-61. 
135. See id. a t  409,482 N.E.2d a t  41,492 N.Y.S.2d a t  562. The jurist has raised a major 
ethical and policy issue in contemporary torts. Should Union Carbide be shielded from the 
consequences of the Bhopal disaster, or a subsequent American toxic calamity, if i t  can be 
shown that the corporation would fail? Does anyone really believe that tort litigation 
against a major public utility might result in the lights of Broadway and the rest of New 
York City going dark? If the majority's approach is valid, what principled guidelines, do 
courts have to distinguish the tortfeasor whom public policy must insulate from judgments 
from all those who regularly expire with or without satisfying judgments entered? Justice 
MeyerP dissent merits thoughtful and respectful attention. 
136. 121 A.D.2d 620, 503 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1986). 
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speeding third-party driver.ls7 The court found that "[als the evi- 
dence only established that the two drivers were simultaneously 
operating their vehicles at high speeds, it cannot, without more, be 
found to support an inference of an intent to race."lS8 It  is clearly 
the plaintiffs burden to prove concert of action and plaintiffs 
counsel's responsibility to thoroughly investigate the relationship, 
if any, between potential defendants.lSB 
Each year, the issue of negligent supervision of children arises 
in one form or another. In Walden By Walden v. Rensselaer Poly- 
technic Institute,140 the defendant raised a counterclaim and re- 
quested contribution or indemnification from the parents of the in- 
jured child."' The child fell onto broken glass on the defendant's 
property which adjoined land owned by the plaintiffs father."% 
The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed recent case 
law concerning negligent supervision of children and found no 
cause of action or counterclaim based on negligent supervision 
could survive.14s I t  found that any negligence arising from the fa- 
ther's knowledge of a dangerous condition created by his daughter 
did not give rise to a general duty independent of the family 
relationship."' 
While some cases are clear as to whether negligent supervision 
or negligence as a reflection of a general duty is the actual basis for 
a cause of action, this is an area in which vague or careless plead- 
ing will cause great problems. Counsel drafting defenses and coun- 
terclaims alleging some failure on the part of a child's parent must 
be sure that they understand the distinctions that have been cre- 
137. See id. a t  620, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  650. 
138. Id. a t  621, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  650. 
139. See id. 
140. 116 A.D.2d 963, 498 N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1986). 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 963, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  290. 
143. See id. a t  964-65, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  291. 
144. See id. a t  964, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  291. The court found: 
Insofar as defendant alleged that the father had dominion over or ownership of the 
property on which his daughter fell and breached a general duty to care for and 
maintain it, we are of a view that the counterclaim is maintainable. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the negligence, defendant assigns to him, is his knowing 
acquiescence in the creation of a dangerous condition by his daughter, that inactiv- 
ity bespeaks not of any breach of a general duty independent of the familial rela- 
tionship, but rather of the failure of the parent to properly supervise the child. 
Id. 
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ated by New York law and restated in Walden. 
The importance of careful pleading in negligence cases was 
also demonstrated by Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch C ~ r p . ' ~ ~  The sole 
cause of action pled was negligen~e."~ The plaintiff, without her 
consent or knowledge, was the subject of a personals advertisement 
in the defendant's newspaper."' The advertisement featured her 
first name and correct telephone number and solicited male com- 
panionship."* Plaintiff sought damages for mental anguish as she 
was harassed by persons who responded to the advertisement and 
by an individual who showed up at  her door, having somehow 
learned her address.149 Justice Aloi, sitting in the Supreme Court, 
Oneida County, held that plaintiff could not recover under existing 
law and entered summmary judgment for the defendant.160 
Although the problem of "Personals" advertisements is dis- 
cussed below in connection with a particularly egregious case,'61 it 
ought to be obvious that New York's law of negligent infliction of 
mental distress, never viewed as ground breaking anywhere, should 
recognize a category of psychic harm related to the placement of 
spurious personal advertisements. If these advertisements are an 
accepted way of soliciting personal relationships, and they clearly 
are, the parties benefiting economically from these services must 
be forced to deal responsibly with the absolutely foreseeable prob- 
lem of spurious ads. The burden of care which would be placed on 
those publications which run personal ads would be minimal and 
cost effective. The harm prevented also would be great. While the 
courts could wait until such an advertisement results in physical 
harm, rape, or death to an innocent victim, it is preferable to see 
the issue addressed sooner. 
A. Damages 
The issue of damages is always with us. In Klump v. Bow- 
man,162 the plaintiff was injured in a fall off a stepladder a t  a "pick 
145. 129 Misc. 2d 477, 493 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct., Oneida Co. 1985). 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at 478,493 N.Y.S.2d at 414. 
150. See id. at 482, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 417. 
151. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text. 
152. 117 A.D.2d 857, 498 N.Y.S.2d 561 (3d Dep't 1986). 
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your own" apples orchard.lBs The trial court ordered, following a 
verdict for plaintiff, a new trial unless the defendant stipulated to 
an almost one hundred percent increase in damages.'" The Appel- 
late Division, Third Department, however, found that the record 
reflected permanent and disabling injuries and a new trial on dam- 
ages alone was ordered.lB6 
Fifteen-year-old boys are often viewed as a pain in the poste- 
rior but just how much is actual damage to a boy's posterior 
worth? In Miller v. Cattabiani,lB6 we learn that birdshot in the left 
buttocks is not worth $150,000 to the victim and $35,000 to the 
mother for loss of services.'B7 The boy's verdict was reduced to a 
still respectable $100,000 while the mother had to be happy with 
$l8,849.91.lB8 
Appellate a d d i t ~ r s ' ~ ~  are fairly rare creatures. In Berman v. 
National Council of Beth Jacob,lBO the Appellate Division, Second 
Department, increased a plaintiffs principal recovery from $30,000 
to $50,000.1e1 The cause had been tried by the court and the appel- 
late court did not feel constrained to accept the trial judge's find- 
ings.le2 In some instances, there may be a special advantage with 
regard to damages in trying a case without a jury. If a plaintiffs 
verdict is deemed to be insufficient, trial counsel should recognize 
that the appellate court has a basis for increasing the verdict which 
it would lack if a trial by jury had taken place. 
B. State and Municipal Entities 
Most of the cases decided during the past Survey year reflect 
153. See id. 
154. See id. a t  857,498 N.Y.S.2d a t  562. 
155. See id. a t  858, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  563. 
156. 119 A.D.2d 864, 500 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1986). 
157. See id. a t  865,500 N.Y.S.2d a t  431. The dissenting justice would not have reduced 
the verdict because there was evidence of permanent nerve damage and the victim was no 
longer acceptable for military service. See id. a t  868, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t  433 (Mikoll, J., 
dissenting). 
158. See id. a t  867, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t  432. 
159. "The power of trial court is to assess damages or increase amount of an inadequate 
award made by jury verdict, as condition of denial of motion for new trial, with consent of 
defendant whether or not plaintiff consents to such action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 
(5th ed. 1979). 
160. 119 A.D.2d 787, 501 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't 1986). 
161. See id at 788, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  413. 
162. See id a t  788, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  414. 
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established law and call for neither notice nor comment. Some pro- 
vide practice pointers and, occasionally, sharp reminders. The 
most interesting cases often arise from the law enforcement area. 
1. Law Enforcement 
For the past several years, an increasingly intensive national 
and statewide campaign to curb drunken driving has resulted in a 
major increase in arrests and prosecutions for driving while intoxi- 
cated (DWI). In New York, persons arrested for DWI are generally 
released after processing if a sober friend or relative is available to 
accept responsibility. DWI arrests are generally nocturnal and the 
offenders are not usually charged with major crimes in addition to 
DWI. Most departments are only too happy to see the arrested 
persons released on an appearance ticket because confinement fa- 
cilities are limited.lbs 
Probably most such released persons are grateful to just sleep 
i t  off in a non-institutional bed. One person who did not was Brad- 
ley D. Kelly who, two hours after having been arrested for DWI, 
killed a motorist while driving.le4 In Shea v. Town of F i ~ h k i l l , ~ ~ ~  
the plaintiffs sought recovery by alleging that the town was negli- 
gent in releasing Kelly into the custody of friends.'bb Kelly had 
163. Chief of Police Donald L. Singer of the Greenburgh, New York Police Department, 
a recognized authority on modern police administration and a member of the New York 
Bar, was interviewed in connection with the preparation of this Article. Singer stated: 
Police departments today are experiencing unprecedented tort litigation. Some of 
the cases arise from alleged negligence with regard to the care of people in tempo- 
rary custody a t  police stations. Aggravating the situation is the increase in driving 
while intoxicated arrests. These subjects have rarely been arrested before, are 
frightened often, and can react to close confinement with behavior that can produce 
injury. I inaugurated a special driving whiie intoxicated program years before the 
major campaigns began and I learned that releasing charged persons into the care of 
competent, that is sober, friends or relatives, was usually the most effective way of 
handling the situation and reducing the possibility of liability. I t  is absolutely in- 
cumbent, however, on either the arresting officer or the desk officer, to direct the 
person being released not to drive again until complete sobriety has returned, to 
also give that information to the people picking the subject up, and to document 
that this direction has been given. 
Telephone interview with Donald L. Singer, Chief of Police, Greenburgh, N.Y. Police De- 
partment (Sept. 9, 1986). 
164. Shea v. Town of Fishkill, 121 A.D.2d 375, 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d 804, 804 (2d Dep't 
1986). 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
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been instructed by police not to drive again that night.lB7 The Ap- 
pellate Division, Second Department, affirmed dismissal of the 
cause of action and restated the rule that no special relationship 
exists between a municipality and the victims of an intoxicated 
driver where the police take no affirmative action to prevent the 
intoxicated person from further driving.lB8 
While it is impossible not to empathize with the plaintiffs in 
this action, the public welfare would not be served by holding in- 
toxicated drivers until they become sober. The majority do not at- 
tempt to drive while intoxicated and the potential tort liability of 
short term incarceration, considering the number of arrests being 
made for DWI, is significant. 
An issue as to whether a general duty to the public exists was 
also analyzed in Coyne v. State.lBS The Appellate Division, Third 
Department, found that the plaintiff could not state a cause of ac- 
tion in negligence and was barred by the statute of limitations 
from bringing a false arrest and malicious prosecution cause of ac- 
tion.170 Coyne claimed that he would not have been arrested if the 
arresting state police investigator had been properly conducting an 
investigation of a report that unlawful dealing with a minor was 
occurring.171 The court correctly found that "[tlhe case law is well 
settled that, on public policy grounds, no legally cognizable cause 
of action exists for negligent investigation of a crime and claim- 
ant's only avenue of relief is by way of the traditional remedies of 
false arrest and malicious prosecution suits."'72 A cause of action 
against the police on a general theory of negligence in conducting 
investigations would undermine the entire apparatus of law en- 
forcement and no such theory has been accepted anywhere. 
Police discretion in determining adequate grounds to establish 
probable cause for an arrest is a key issue in many preliminary 
criminal proceedings. I t  is also a possible basis for civil damages 
against a rnuni~ipality.'~~ In Orndorff v. De Nooyer Chevrolet, 
167. See id. 
168. See id. at 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (citations omitted). 
169. 120 A.D.2d 769, 501 N.Y.S.2d 505 (3d Dep't 1986). 
170. See id. at 770, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506. 
171. See id. at 769, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506. 
172. See id. at 770, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (citations omitted). 
173. See Orndorff v. De Nooyer Chevrolet, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 365,503 N.Y.S.2d 444 (3d 
Dep't 1986). 
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Inc.,17' the Appellate Division, Third Department, sustained a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the Town of C01onie.l~~ The 
plaintiff had left his car for repairs with defendant De Nooyer 
Chevr01et.l~~ After receiving less than attentive responses to his re- 
peated requests, he asked the defendant's employee Nelson what 
he had to do to retrieve his car.177 "Nelson allegedly replied in a 
flippant manner, '[dlo whatever you like.' Shortly thereafter 
the plaintiff entered the lot where his car was and drove it away.17s 
Subsequently, Nelson reported the car as stolen but also informed 
police that the "[clar may be in possession of owner; owner possi- 
bly took car and did not pay $4000 bill."lS0 On this basis, the car 
was entered into the computer system as a stolen vehicle.lS1 A few 
days later, plaintiff was stopped by police, arrested, processed, and 
held overnight in the Albany County Jai1.lS2 He was charged with 
the nonexistent crime of theft of what amounted to a disputed 
debt, a charge dismissed in court.lSs The Third Department af- 
firmed a judgment against the Town of Colonie for $31,250 for 
both false arrest and malicious prosecution.184 
The officer on patrol who stopped Orndorff had reasonable 
grounds for both the stop and field investigation. The car might, 
indeed, have been stolen. The information furnished by Nelson, 
however, should have been available to officers in the field. To pro- 
ceed to arrest the registered owner of a car, a person unlikely to 
disappear if a further investigation developed, was gross 
negligence.lE6 
174. See id. 
175. See id. a t  366, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  445. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. a t  366, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  446. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. at 367, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  446. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. a t  368, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  447. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. It is hard to conceive of a better textbook case to establish municipal tort 
liability. There was no colorable basis for the arrest of Omdorff. The report filed by Nelson 
in itself should have alerted the desk sergeant or o5cer taking the report that while the car 
might have been stolen, i t .  possession by the owner of record would be at  most a civil mat- 
ter between the person reporting the alleged theft and the owner. 
185. See id. a t  368-69,503 N.Y.S.2d a t  447. Counsel for police departments and munici- 
palities can appraise this case in two ways. I t  may be viewed as a certain indicator of how 
their police department will fare a t  trial under similar facts or i t  may suggest the need for 
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The Court of Claims reviewed the rationale and validity of the 
traditional "Fireman's Rule" in Santangelo v. State.lS8 Several po- 
lice officers asserted that the injuries they incurred while appre- 
hending a dangerous escaped mental patient were proximately re- 
lated to the state's negligent confinement of the patient.ls7 The 
patient had a history of both escape and violence.188 
Judge Benza dismissed the claims of the officers.1se The state 
both denied that its employees had been negligent, a question of 
fact, and asserted the absence of any duty to the injured officers, a 
primary issue of law.leO Judge Benza noted that the traditional rule 
which precludes recovery by police officers and fire fighters for 
negligence which gives rise to a call for their special services has 
little explanatory and interpretive case law in New York.lS1 The 
weight of case law demonstrates, however, that the "Fireman's 
Rule" has been consistently followed.1e2 
Although there is an exception to the "Fireman's Rule" in- 
volving a duty to warn potential victims of a known danger, Judge 
Benza found that this exception does not apply to police who may 
not avoid the very danger represented by the threat.le8 "It would 
strain statutory interpretation to agree that a regulation or statute 
seeking to warn a person of a specific danger would at the same 
time mandate this individual to seek out and apprehend that very 
danger to prevent injury, ostensibly to himself."194 
continuing education of police as to both constitutional and tort law guidelines. The latter 
approach is believed to be the right one. Few municipalities today can afford tort judgments 
and prevention is better than defending avoidable, losing cases. 
186. 129 Misc. 2d 898, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Ct. C1. 1985). 
187. See id. a t  899,494 N.Y.S.2d a t  49. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. a t  908, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  55. 
190. See id. a t  901, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
191. See id. a t  903-04, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  52-53. 
192. See id. a t  903, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  52. 
193. See id. a t  907, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  55. 
194. Id. The judge's interpretation of the non-applicability of the "Fireman's Rule" ex- 
ception to the facts in Santangelo is compelling. The paradox created by the plaintiffs' 
theory is that it would, as the judge noted, "impose on the public a duty to provide a police- 
man with a work environment free of potential danger." See id. Potential danger is, of 
course, a t  the heart of the calling of both the police and fire fighting vocations. "Public 
policy is better served by the continuation of the fireman's rule in New York and, as the 
injuries sustained by the claimants were a direct result of the negligence which occasioned 
their presence a t  the place of the occurrence, their claims are dismissed." 
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In Smith u. City of Neul York,lS6 the Appellate Division, Sec- 
ond Department, affrmed the dismissal by the trial court of an 
action brought by hospital employees who had been taken hostage 
by an inmate brought to the hospital for treatment.lB8 The plain- 
tiffs claimed both physical and psychic injuries.lS7 The problem 
with the plaintiffs' case was that it "failed to establish the exis- 
tence of a special relationship between themselves and the New 
York City Department of Corrections . . . which would have pro- 
tected them from the dangers posed by an escaped inmate."1ss The 
major evidentiary failing is that while the plaintiffs asserted reli- 
ance on the defendant for protection, no evidence to indicate such 
reliance was presented to the trial C O U ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~  While this case was cor- 
rectly decided, it is unclear if plaintiffs' defeat on the merits was 
due to inadequate presentation of evidence or actual lack of sup- 
portive facts.200 
The liability of a landlord for criminal activities committed by 
third parties against tenants is a major area of housing law. A 
somewhat different fact pattern was presented in Waters u. New 
York City Housing A ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~ ~  A junior high school student was 
accosted outside a housing project owned and operated by the de- 
fendant.202 She was forced a t  knife point into a project building 
through an unlocked door, taken to the roof, robbed, and repeat- 
edly sexually abused.20s The housing authority was aware that 
there was a broken door lock used as the point of entry and that 
the tenants were concerned about potential incidents resulting 
from the unlocked door.204 
Justice Weinstein, writing for the majority, affirmed the grant- 
ing of summary judgment for the housing authority.206 While rec- 
ognizing that landlords owe a duty to exercise some care to prevent 
the criminal victimization of both tenants and visitors to buildings, 
195. 122 A.D.2d 133, 504 N.Y.S.2d 696 (2d Dep't 1986). 
196. See id. at 133, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
197. See id. 
198. Id. (citations omitted). 
199. See id. at 134, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98. 
200. See id. 
201. 116 A.D.2d 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1986). 
202. See id. at 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 386. 
203. See id. Her assailant was neither identified nor subsequently apprehended. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 385-86. 
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the court found that "it is clear that a duty of care does not de- 
volve upon the defendant New York City Housing Authority with 
respect to all persons who regularly traffic the city streets and side- 
w a l k ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The court noted that the infant victim in Waters was 
not a visitor to the building and that the authority had no knowl- 
edge of the presence of a dangerous person near their premises.a07 
The majority reasoned that the result of finding the existence of a 
duty in this fact pattern would be to potentially establish liability 
in virtually all cases where a possessor of a building failed to install 
or use 
New York has, of course, abandoned the traditional classifica- 
tion of visitors to land as the measuring stick of The mod- 
ern rule is that property must be maintained based upon a reason- 
able standard of care and foreseeability is relevant to determine 
whether a possessor of land departed from the duty owed to virtu- 
ally Thus, the abrogation of the hoary traditional duty con- 
cept has not brought with it, nor could it, unlimited and ruinous 
liability for land owners and landlords.a11 
If the modern duty concept had been properly applied in Wa- 
ters, the housing authority would be viewed as owing a duty of 
reasonable care to all who found themselves on its premises. 
Whether the authority deviated from the required standard of care 
would be a jury question and it is quite possible the authority 
would have prevailed.212 
206. See id. a t  386-87, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  387. 
207. See id. a t  387, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  387. 
208. See id. a t  388, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  388. Justice Eiber, penning a dissent in which 
Justice Brown concurred, identified the fatal reasoning adopted by the majority. 
Contrary to the view of the majority, this case centers not on the duty of a landlord 
to control the criminal acts of third parties, but, rather, on the duty of a landlord to 
maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Because the majority would, 
contrary to established precedent, adopt a position which makes the status of an 
entrant onto land the dispositive factor in determining whether a duty is owed to 
that party, because they have opted to draw a concededly arbitrary line of demarca- 
tion with respect to the scope of liability, and because the majority's holding would 
effectively usurp the power to determine issues which should properly lie within the 
province of the jury, I respectfully dissent. 
Id. a t  388-89, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  388 (Eiber, J., dissenting). 
209. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). 
210. See Waters, 116 A.D.2d a t  386-87, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  387. 
211. See, e.g., id. 
212. The majority's unacknowledged but real dependence on a rejected model of duty 
deprived the plaintiff of having the opportunity to establish that a t  minimal cost and care. 
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Away from the world of crime, the Court of Appeals, in 
Dermatossian u. New York City Transit Authority,213 reversed the 
appellate division which had affirmed a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff.214 The plaintiff had supposedly sustained injuries when 
he hit his head on a bus grab handle which was defective.216 Judge 
Hancock, writing for a unanimous Court, examined the two issues 
presented.216 The first issue arose over a trial court ruling permit- 
ting the admission into evidence of proof of the defendant's pay- 
ment of no-fault, first party benefits.217 The second issue was 
raised by the plaintiffs reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa lo- 
q ~ i t o r . ~ l ~  The Court found for the defendant on both issues on 
appeal.21s 
Judge Hancock found that the trial court admitted evidence 
on the payment of first party benefits because it reflected an ad- 
mission by the defendant that the plaintiff had, in point of fact, 
sustained an injury on the defendant's The jurist noted, 
however: 
The payment of no-fault benefits, in response to plaintiffs 
facially valid sworn claim that he had been hurt on the bus, 
proved nothing more tharl that, a t  the time of payment, defend- 
ant had determined that there was no valid basis for challenging 
the truth of plaintiffs assertions . . . and, thereby, avoiding its 
statutory obligation to pay first party benefits promptly after loss 
her assailant would not have been able to force her through the unlocked door to face rape 
and sodomy. Beyond the scope of this infant plaintiffs tragic encounter with a dangerous 
criminal, the duty analysis in Waters does nothing to advance the goal of encouraging land- 
lords to survey their premises and attempt to prevent both minor offenses and major crimes. 
Departure from the ancient duty rule was compatible with modern expectations about 
buildings and their owners and managers. Public housing officials ought to be under no less 
a duty than their private sector counterparts. 
I t  will hardly surprise any reader to learn that the majority of municipal housing 
projects in New York City are in exactly those neighborhoods where the type of crime Wa- 
ters encountered is a serious problem. The hairsplitting and anachronistic reasoning in this 
case does little to help control this crime. 
213. 67 N.Y.2d 219,492 N.E.2d 1200,501 N.Y.S.2d 784 (19861, reu'g, 109 A.D.2d 1106, 
487 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1985) (mem.). 
214. See id. a t  228,492 N.E.2d a t  1205,501 N.Y.S.2d a t  789. I t  might have been better 
to describe the handle as broken or damaged. 
215. See id. a t  221, 492 N.E.2d a t  1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  785. 
216. See id. a t  221-22, 492 N.E.2d a t  1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  785. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. a t  222, 492 N.E.2d a t  1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  785. 
220. See id. at 222-23, 492 N.E.2d a t  1202, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  786. 
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Judge Hancock's interpretation for the Court is important in as- 
suring that potential negligence defendants do not hesitate to alle- 
viate and perhaps minimize injuries through the prompt payment 
of first party benefits for fear that such payment will constitute 
damning evidence inferring liability a t  trial. The viewpoint ex- 
pressed by the plaintiff would have effectively thwarted the public 
policy purpose underlying first party payments without aiding in 
resolving 1itigati0n.P~~ 
Justice Hancock's analysis of the res ipsa loquitor issue is less 
satisfying. After reviewing the New York doctrine of res ipsa lo- 
q ~ i t o r : ~ ~  Justice Hancock directed his focus to the element of ex- 
clusive control.224 He found: 
[Tlhe plaintiff did not establish control of the grab handle by de- 
fendant of sufficient exclusivity to fairly rule out the chance that 
the defect in the handle was caused by some agency other than 
defendant's negligence. The proof did not adequately exclude the 
chance that the handle had been damaged by one or more of de- 
fendant's passengers who were invited to use it.226 
This treatment of the element of exclusive control, as interpreted 
by Judge Hancock and applied to the facts disclosed by the record, 
is not mandated by New York case law. A plaintiff need not ex- 
clude virtually every possibility that tampering by or the negli- 
gence of someone other than the defendant caused the dangerous 
injury-producing condition.226 
Mesick v. decided by the Appellate Division, Third 
221. Id. a t  222, 492 N.E.2d a t  1202, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  786. 
222. See id. a t  225, 492 N.E.2d a t  1203-04, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  787-88. 
223. See id. a t  226, 492 N.E.2d a t  1204, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  788. 
224. See id. a t  227-28, 492 N.E.2d a t  1205, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  789. 
225. Id. a t  228,492 N.E.2d a t  1205, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t  789. 
226. Here the bus was in the general and exclusive control of the defendant. Even New 
York City buses receive some minimum maintenance each day, but the documentation in 
probably not equal to that found in the airline industry. The likelihood that a relatively 
minor defect, such as the one which injured plaints, would be both noticed and ignored, ia 
an inference permissible under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and probably true in this 
case. They key issue is not whether the defendant itself, through an employee, created the 
defect, a highly improbable possibility, but rather whether the existence of the defect, who- 
ever caused it, was the underpinning for the negligence of the defendant in not detecting, 
documenting and correcting i t  in a bus under its exclusive control before the defect caused 
harm. 
227. 118 A.D.2d 214, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1986). For a discussion of this case, 
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Department, is a case crying for reversal by the Court of Appeals. 
A seventeen year-old boy was rendered a quadriplegic when he fell 
onto rocks near a hole where he was swimming with friends?28 He 
had been attempting to use a rope to dive into the water.120 The 
property on which the horrible accident took place was state- 
owned and "[tlhe area was posted with signs limiting the permissi- 
ble use of the area to fishing."280 The majority found that the state 
was aware that the pool dedicated for fishing use was also used for 
swimming, and that a girl had been injured two years before plain- 
tiffs injury while using a rope to dive frorn.Ps1 "Since the proof 
established a likelihood of injury and the foreseeability of claim- 
ant's presence on the property, a duty of care arose on the part of 
the State."282 
Because it appeared to be clear to the majority that mere re- 
moval of the rope would have been an inadequate exercise of care, 
ropes being easily replaced by adolescent swimming hole enthusi- 
asts, the court suggested that "the risk could have been avoided by 
the simple expedient of cutting the tree down."288 
In his dissent, Justice Casey first tackled the duty issue?" He 
noted that the state developed and used the land where the acci- 
dent occurred solely for public fishing and that notices to that ef- 
fect were p0sted.4~~ Applying General Obligations Law section 9- 
103,4s8 Justice Casey noted that fishing is a "use" therein enumer- 
ated.s87 He found it illogical to impose upon the state the far 
broader standard of reasonable care on the theory that claimant 
sustained his injuries while actually engaged in an activity not enu- 
merated in General Obligations Law section 9-103.888 
Even if the standard of reasonable care had been applied, 
me Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of Torts: A Call for Judicial Scrutiny in Com- 
paring "Culpable Conduct" Under New York's CPLR 1411, 37 SYRACUSE L.REV. 1079 
(1987). 
228. See id. at 216, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280-81. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. at 216, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280. 
231. See id. at 215-16, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280. 
232. Id. at 217, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 281. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284 (Casey, J., dissenting). 
235. See id. 
236. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 9-103 (McKiney 1978). 
237. See Mesick, 118 A.D.2d at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284. 
238. See id.; see also, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 9-103. 
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rather than duty analysis under the aforementioned ~ t a t u t e , 8 ~ ~  Jus- 
tice Casey would still have found for the defendant as he found 
that the area was only dangerous to those engaged in a prohibited 
activity.240 Justice Casey then identified the real evil underlying a 
finding that the state breached a duty of reasonable care in main- 
taining the fishing site.241 "[Tlhe State should not be required to 
undertake drastic measures, which would destroy the scenic and 
natural beauty of the site and perhaps render it unfit for its in- 
tended purpose . . . . ,9242 
Twin fallacies underlie the majority's affirmation of the ver- 
dict for the plaintiff. The first is that any governmental entity can 
absorb multi-million dollar verdicts, such as that rendered here, 
and still provide recreational sites and refuges under all but the 
most tightly controlled situations. If tight supervision and ongoing 
control is mandated, the number of sites must decrease and the 
first to go will be the barely improved natural sites so vital not 
only for recreation but for conservation. The second fallacy is that 
the common law requires the mutilation or destruction of natural 
features of public lands so as to make those properties safer for 
those who will not, or cannot, comply with clearly posted restric- 
tions. The majority's argument here is on the classical slippery 
slope. Once established as a doctrine, a duty to efface natural fea- 
tures of property becomes a mandate for wholesale obliteration as 
additional injuries are reported and bureaucrats and administra- 
tors place greater value on preventing harm than on preserving na- 
ture. Thus, the majority's formulation is inherently impossible to 
achieve as a workable standard of due care. The common law has 
never equated a reasonable standard of care with the un- 
measurable, the unquantifiable, and the unachievable. 
239. See Mesick, 118 A.D.2d at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284. 
240. See id. Justice Casey reasoned: 
The rocky slope where claimant sustained his injuries was not dangerous to those 
who used the premises for its only authorized purpose-fishing. The condition was 
dangerous only to those who sought to enhance the thrill of engaging in the prohib- 
ited activity of swimming by using an inherently perilous method of entering the 
water. As to those persons, the condition was clearly dangerous upon mere 
inspection. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
241. See id. 
242. Id. 
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A. Products Liability 
New York products liability law continues to develop along its 
own track. It  is interesting that a fair number of practitioners have 
failed, still, to grasp that an action for personal injuries or property 
damage caused by a defective product sounds in tort. Counsel con- 
tinue to bring actions with one cause of action in strict products 
liability and a second in breach of warranty without any prayer for 
relief under the warranty cause different from that sought under 
the strict products liability cause. Perhaps no harm to case or cli- 
ent is caused by this form of pleading but a reasonably close study 
of New York case law demonstrates that this approach is doctri- 
nally incorrect. Breach of warranty should only be brought when a 
plaintiff is seeking damages recoverable in tort law. 
The Court of Appeals decided three products liability cases 
during the Survey year worthy of mention. In Rosado v. Proctor & 
Schwartz, In~.,2'~ the Court affirmed the dismissal of a cause of 
action seeking indemnifi~ation.~" Judge Titone, writing for a unan- 
imous Court, stated: 
The issue is whether a manufacturer of a defective product may 
obtain indemnification from the purchaser where the sales con- 
tract contains a provision requiring the purchaser to install cer- 
tain safety devices and the purchaser's employee, who is injured 
by the failure to install such devices, brings an action against the 
manufacturer predicated on the manufacturer's marketing of a 
machine that is not reasonably safe.246 
The plaintiff was injured by a machine used in the textile in- 
d ~ s t r y . ~ ' ~  Barred from suing his employer for this industrial acci- 
dent because of Workers' Compensation, the injured employee 
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the 
machine.247 After the trial began but before a verdict was returned, 
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. (Proctor) settled with R o s a d ~ . ~ ' ~  
243. 66 N.Y.2d 21, 484 N.E.2d 1354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1985). 
244. See id. 
245. Id. at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852. 
246. See id. at 23,484 N.E.2d at 1355,494 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The machine is known as a 
garnett and is used to convert bunches of clumped fiber into matting. 
247. See id. 
248. See id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1356, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 853. 
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Proctor, not surprisingly, wished to shift all or part of its lia- 
bility to Rosado onto Comet Fibers, Inc. (Comet), Rosado's em- 
ployer and the purchaser of the injury-producing machine.24s New 
York law permits, as a general matter, actions for contribution and 
indemnifiiation by product manufacturers against the employers 
of persons injured by their defective products.P50 The ability to 
maintain such an action is, however, dependent on factors not pre- 
sent in R o ~ a d o . ~ ~ '  
Proctor, in its third-party action, sought indemnification 
based on the failure of Comet to perform according to the sales 
contract that required installation of certain safety devices.p5s 
Proctor actually wished to place upon Comet full responsibility for 
the injury sustained by Rosad0.2~~ 
The Court rejected Proctor's arguments.P5' The essential pur- 
pose of strict liability is to hold the manufacturer of a product ac- 
countable for those defects that cause i n j ~ r y . 8 ~ ~  Judge Titone 
found: 
[Wlhere, as here, the manufacturer is in the best position to know 
the dangers inherent in its product, and the dangers do not vary 
depending on job site, it  is also in the best position to determine 
what safety devices should be employed . . . . Preventing injuries 
in the first place is the primary public policy underlying the doc- 
trine of strict products liability. To allow a manufacturer like 
Proctor . . . to shift the ultimate duty of care to others through 
boilerplate language in a sales contract, would erode the economic 
incentive manufacturers have to maintain safety and give sanc- 
tion to the marketing of dangerous, stripped down  machine^.'^ 
This well-reasoned, unanimous decision should set straight the 
boundaries of permissible third-party claims for relief in the indus- 
trial accident field. It is natural that machinery and product manu- 
facturers, obviously aware that the institution of litigation against 
them is often a t  least partially spurred by the unavailability to the 
249. See id .  at 23,484 N.E.2d at 1355-56,494 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53. 
250. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 35 A.D.2d 149,316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970). rev'd, 30 
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). 
251. See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852. 
252. See id .  at 22-23,484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 853. 
253. See id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1356,494 N.Y.S.2d at 853. 
254. See id. at 25, 484 N.E.2d at 1357,494 N.Y.S.2d at 855. 
255. See id. 
256. Id. at 26-27, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855. 
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plaintiff of a tort remedy against an employer, would look to the 
employer to share or absorb the burden. Judge Titone's opinion 
states that this is unacceptable in what, on analysis, is the majority 
of lawsuits brought by injured employees. Manufacturers con- 
cerned about this liability and who are in a strong bargaining posi- 
tion-the purchaser needs the supplier more than the supplier 
needs the purchaser-ought to incorporate clear indemnification 
provisions in sales contracts. This form of potential loss shifting 
does not raise any public policy issues or problems discussed by 
Judge Titone in Rosado. 
Although not discussed in the Court's opinion in Rosado, it 
seems fairly clear that sales contracts in which a purchaser under- 
takes to install safety equipment that the seller knows should be 
furnished before use of the product are very unlikely to be per- 
formed as written. An experienced manufacturer, selling highly 
specialized industrial machinery, is under no illusions as to the op- 
erating milieu of his equipment. Proctor could not have seriously 
expected that most of their customers would hasten to install 
safety devices mentioned in the sales contract. To allow a manu- 
facturer-seller to rely upon such a provision would make a mockery 
of the public policy underlying strict products liability. 
Illustrating the importance of evidentiary matters in complex 
products liability litigation is the Court of Appeals decision in 
Sawyer u. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co.267 Plaintiff was in- 
jured by a sheet metal shaping machine and brought an action 
against the manufacturer of the machine.268 The manufacturer 
brought a third-party action against Cambridge Filter Corporation, 
plaintiffs employer.268 The appellate court afErmed a jury verdict 
for the plaintiff but New York's final judicial forum reversed and 
granted a new trial.g60 The Court found error in all the issues 
under con~ideration.~~~ "The principal issue . . . is whether the trial 
court committed error in submitting the question of plaintiffs am- 
nesia to the jury in the absence of expert testimony supporting his 
claim or causally relating the amnesia to the accident . . . and in 
permitting plaintiffs engineering expert to testify how the accident 
257. 67 N.Y.2d 328, 493 N.E.2d 920, 502 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1986). 
258. See id. at 331,493 N.E.2d at 922, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
259. See id. 
260. See id. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 922, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
261. See id. 
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happened."262 
The Court reviewed what it termed to be the "familiar law"263 
concerning the lessened burden placed upon an accident victim 
whose amnesia precludes testifying as to the events of the inci- 
dent.264 The issue to be decided in Sawyer was whether an expert 
was required to establish an evidentiary foundation for amnesia 
because, as the Court noted, this condition can be feigned.265 Al- 
though most prior cases apparently featured expert testimony, the 
question of whether it is required was novel.266 
The Court concluded that the testimony of the plaintiff in 
which he claimed amnesia alone, without expert testimony, was in- 
sufficient to allow him to benefit from the lessened burden of the 
amnesiac.267 This evidentiary holding, of course, goes beyond prod- 
ucts liability litigation. In the future, in all tort actions in which 
amnesia of a plaintiff is claimed, sufficient foundation by a quali- 
fied expert must be presented.26e In Smith v. Stark,ZBB the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the appellate division's granting of a pool manu- 
facturer's motion for summary judgment.270 The plaintiff was in- 
jured when he either dove or was thrown by friends into a pool 
manufactured by the defendant.271 The Court found that if he 
dove into the pool, he had to have been aware that he was entering 
the shallow end and if he was thrown into the water, the failure of 
the manufacturer to place depth markers was irrelevant.272 What is 
262. Id. 
263. See id. a t  333-34, 493 N.E.2d a t  923-24, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  699-700. 
264. See id.  a t  333-34, 493 N.E.2d a t  923, 502 N.Y.S.2d at  699. 
265. See id. a t  334, 493 N.E.2d a t  924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  700. 
266. See id.; see also Barker, Evidence, supra this Survey. 
267. See id. at 335, 493 N.E.2d a t  924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  700. The Court found: 
Amnesia, like most medical conditions, is beyond the understanding of laymen and 
expert evidence on the matter is not only helpful, i t  is required if plaintiff is to 
prove the condition by clear and convincing evidence . . . . [Wlithout the aid of 
experts, a jury of laymen is not capable of evaluating the effects of a trauma or the 
symptoms which may verify a loss of memory and indicate that it is real and not 
feigned. In the absence of expert evidence establishing a loss of memory and its 
causal relationship to defendant's fault, the jury may not consider the question or 
apply a lesser degree of proof in evaluating plaintiffs claim . . . . 
Id. a t  334-35, 493 N.E.2d a t  924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  700. 
268. See id. 
269. 67 N.Y.2d 693,490 N.E.2d 841,499 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1986), aff'g, 111 A.D.2d 913,490 
N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d Dep't 1985). 
270. See id. a t  695, 490 N.E.2d a t  842,499 N.Y.S.2d a t  923. 
271. See id. a t  694, 490 N.E.2d a t  842, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  923. 
272. See id. 
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surprising is that this action seems to have been brought solely 
sounding in negligence.273 
As discussed in the Medical Malpractice actions 
based on prenatal injuries continue to be In the prod- 
ucts liability field, similar actions are brought. In Catherwood v. 
American Sterilizer C 0 . y  the plaintiffs sought damages for pre- 
conception harm to the mother because of exposure to the defend- 
ant's chemical The mother's exposure allegedly caused 
chromosomal alteration in the child subsequently conceived.278 
Justice Mintz granted the defendant's motion to d i smi~s .2~~ 
Relying upon Albala v. City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~ ~  the justice found that 
no analytic approach permitted a finding that any tort cause of 
action exists in New York for alleged precdnception The 
jurist's concise and well-written opinion is an excellent and precise 
discussion of this subject. 
A twist on the recurrent efforts of employees to find some way 
to skirt employers' insulation from tort liability because of Work- 
ers' Compensation is provided by Copp v. Corning Glass Works.282 
In Copp, an injured employee sued his former employer which had 
sold the injury causing machine to his present empl0yer.2~~ Corn- 
ing, however, was not the original purchaser of the machine.284 The 
court f i r m e d  the dismissal of the action, noting that the "defend- 
ant, successor to the original purchaser . . . had no part in . . . 
design or manufacture and had made no modifications which in- 
creased the risk of injury."286 
While the approach in Copp was creative, it lacked any foun- 
dation in law. A manufacturer who is a successor to the original 
manufacturer of a defective product may be liable to a victim, but 
a successor purchaser certainly is not. 
273. See id. 
274. See supra notes 1-62 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text. 
276. 130 hlisc. 2d 872, 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1986). 
277. See id. at 873, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 704. 
278. See id. 
279. See id. at 875-76, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
280. 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981). 
281. See Catherwood, 130 Misc. 2d at 875, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
282. 114 A.D.2d 144, 497 N.Y.S.2d 970 (4th Dep't 1986). 
283. See id. at 145, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 971. 
284. See id. 
285. See id. at 146, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 972. 
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Numerous injuries are sustained annually because of defective 
equipment that was purchased in a used condition. Whether strict 
products liability applies to actions based on harm caused by used 
equipment requires close factual analysis. In Sukljian v. Charles 
Ross & Son C O . , ~ ~ ~  the Appellate Division, Third Department, 
found, as a matter of law, that strict products liability does not 
apply when the defendant was an occasional seller not regularly 
engaged in selling the product, or the type of product, which 
caused In this case, the machinery sold was specifically 
offered on a "As Is Where Is" basis and was a sale of surplus 
In affirming a summary judgment for an equipment manufac- 
turer, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Silverstein v. 
Walsh Press & Die C O . , ~ ~ ~  disposed of an action based upon an 
injury produced by a machine manufactured in 1947.290 The appel- 
late panel agreed that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any 
proximate causation linking the manufacturer of the thirty-year- 
old punch press with the defect that caused plaintiffs injury.2e1 
The machine had been modified over its service This is the 
sort of vexatious case which suggests the wisdom of a statute of 
repose for New York State. 
Intervening conduct, of either a tortious or a criminal nature, 
may break the chain of causation linking an injury to an alleged 
defect in a product. The problem, of course, is to determine at 
what point the conduct of an actor insulates a seller or manufac- 
turer from strict products liability. This point was dealt with by 
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Craft v. Mid Island 
Department Stores, Inc.2ss The infant plaintiff, wearing a sweat- 
shirt manufactured and distributed by the defendants, was se- 
verely burned when he and a playmate were pouring gasoline and 
lighting the It is unclear whether the burned child or the 
playmate lit the match that caused the injury-producing flash of 
286. 116 A.D.2d 9, 499 N.Y.S.2d 466 (3d Dep't 1986). 
287. See id. at 12, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 468. 
288. See id. 
289. 119 A.D.2d 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1986). 
290. See id. at 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98. 
291. See id. at 659-60, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98. 
292. See id. at 659, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98. 
293. 112 A.D.2d 969, 492 N.Y.S.2d 780 (2d Dep't 1985). 
294. See id. at 969, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 781. 
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fire.2gVhile recognizing that New York law precludes recovery 
where a plaintiff has engaged in "serious criminal or illegal con- 
the court found that rule to be inapplicable in the instant 
case.2g7 "Here none of the defendants point to any penal statute 
applicable to the use of gasoline."298 In any event, "the Court of 
Appeals has permitted plaintiffs to bring suit where they might 
have been guilty of minor criminal offenses."299 
An attempt to hold a trade association strictly liable for its 
role in the promulgation and dissemination of standards for tires 
and tire rims was rejected in Beasock u. Dioguardi Enterprises, 
I ~ C . ~ O O  Plaintiffs decedent had succumbed to injuries received 
when he attempted to inflate a tire mounted on a rim too large for 
the tire.s01 While the court recognized the importance of the de- 
fendant Tire and Rim Association in the industry,s02 the court 
found that the trade association did not manufacture or market 
the tire products that were alleged to have caused the injury and, 
hence, could not be held liable.80s 
B. Dram Shop 
Demon Rum is still with us and along with intoxicating liquors 
come a continuing host of tort issues. As noted in previous Survey 
articles:04 New York continues to decline, either through judicial 
decision or legislative enactment, to create liability for social hosts 
who serve alcohol to inebriated guests who subsequently injure 
someone.s05 
295. See id. 
296. See id. a t  971, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t  782. 
297. See id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. 130 Misc. 2d 25, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1985). 
301. See id. a t  26, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  975. 
302. See id. a t  28, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  977. 
303. See id. a t  29, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t  978. The court found: 
Since TRA does not manufacture or market tires or rims generally and did not 
manufacture or market the tire or rim alleged to have caused the injury in this case, 
liability cannot be imposed upon it  under the theories of either strict products lia- 
bility or breach of warranty. These actions impose liability only against defendants 
who are directly involved in the manufacture or distribution of the product which 
caused the injury. See id. 
304. See, e.g., Torts, 1984 Survey, supra note 3, a t  624; Stein, Torts, 1983 Survey of 
N.Y. Law, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 651,670-71 (1984). 
305. See supra note 304. 
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In Conigliaro v. F r a n ~ o , ~ ~ ~  the Appellate Division, Second De- 
partment, reversed the trial court's denial of the defendants' mo- 
tion for summary judgment.s07 The victim, in Conigliaro, sustained 
serious injuries in a car crash with a man who had recently left the 
defendants' home after consuming about five cans of beer.308 The 
plaintiff attempted to bring the defendants within the scope of 
New York's Dram Shop In this case, not only did the plain- 
tiff fail to meet her burden of showing there had been a sale of 
alcohol to the man who injured her, "but it appear[ed] from the 
plaintiffs opposition papers that before instituting this action she 
possessed sufficient facts to indicate that the appellants could not 
be held liable under the Dram Shop Act . . . ."310 Not only was the 
plaintiffs claim legally without merit, but the role of her counsel in 
bringing this action is open to questi~n.~" 
In Powers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,812 Justice Mer- 
cure refused to apply the provisions of the Dram Shop Act where 
underage and sober purchasers bought beer from a defendant eight 
hours before causing an injury in an automobile accident.31s The 
justice reviewed all relevant legislation and analyzed the legislative 
history underlying General Obligations Law section 11-100,814 
which creates a cause of action against a person who furnishes al- 
cohol to anyone under the age of nineteen where the person so pro- 
vided with alcohol causes physical injury.s15 Justice Mercure found 
306. 122 A.D.2d 15, 504 N.Y.S.2d 186 (2d Dep't 1986). 
307. See id. 
308. See id. a t  16, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  186. 
309. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987). 
310. See Conigliaro, 122 A.D.2d a t  16, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t  187. 
311. See id. 
312. 132 Misc. 2d 123, 503 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct., Schenectady Co. 1986). 
313. See id. a t  126-27, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  517-18. 
314. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 11-100(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). 
315. See Powers, 132 Misc. 2d a t  125, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t  518. New York General Obliga- 
tions Law section 11-100(1) provides: 
Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, 
by reason of the intoxication or impairment of ability of any person under the age 
of nineteen years, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action 
to recover actual damages against any person who knowingly causes such intoxica- 
tion or impairment of ability by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in 
procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with knowledge or reasonable cause to 
believe that such person was under age of nineteen years. 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW $ 11-100(1) (the action accrued in 1983, two years before the drinking 
age was increased to twenty-one). 
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this provision to be inapplicable to the case at bar.316 
Justice Mercure's analysis is sound, but the result reached is 
not tolerable. There is a major public policy purpose in keeping 
alcoholic beverages out of the possession of those too young to be 
legally allowed to drink. Application of the Dram Shop Act is diffi- 
cult enough because of the plaintiffs need to prove that the pur- 
chaser was intoxicated at the time he or she acquired alcohol from 
a defendant seller. With juveniles, the issue is much broader than 
the question of intoxication at  point-of-sale. Without alcohol, 
young and inexperienced drivers are involved in a disproportionate 
number of both minor and major accidents. With alcohol, the odds 
of a serious or fatal accident increase dramatically. The Powers 
case illustrates a vacuum in the law which must be addressed ei- 
ther by the extension of common law duty or by legislative action. 
VI. INTENTIONAL TORTS 
A. Privacy and Publicity 
As New York continues to be one of the minority of jurisdictions 
which lack either a common law right of privacy or a broad statu- 
tory protection of privacy interests, privacy invasion allegations in 
New York are generally confined to actions brought under sections 
5OSl7 and 5lSl8 of the Civil Rights Law. Plaintiffs who have suffered 
what amounts to an invasion of privacy often also resort to plead- 
ing, sometimes inappropriately, libel or causes of action such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort. 
In Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside,S1* the Appellate Di- 
vision, Second Department, reversed the trial court and dismissed 
a complaint that essentially raised privacy issues.320 The plaintiffs 
sought to recover for the emotional distress which they exper- 
ienced because of the fatal illness of their nine-month-old infant.321 
In Smith, the parents apparently were unaware of either the diag- 
nosis or the prognosis of their baby until a few weeks before the 
baby's They apparently gained their knowledge of the 
316. See Powers, 132 Misc. 2d at 127, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 519. 
317. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW 8 50 (McKiney 1976). 
318. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW 8 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). 
319. 118 A.D.2d 553, 499 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2d Dep't 1986). 
320. See id. at 554-55, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
321. See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
322. See id. 
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prognosis when they read an article in a local newspaper which, 
without naming their baby, referred to a critically ill baby in the 
defendant's pediatric intensive care unit as "doomed."sas The 
description of the mortally ill child was sufficient for the parents to 
recognize that the subject of the article was their baby.ss4 While 
the insensitivity of hospital personnel in releasing information suf- 
ficient to allow uninformed parents to learn the truth of their 
child's condition through a news article is revolting, no cause of 
action in New York can arise from this type of incident.sa6 
Almost two years after the death of the baby, however, the 
plaintiffs "saw photographs of their child displayed in the defend- 
ant hospital and in a shopping center as part of a campaign adver- 
tising the opening of defendant's new children's hospital."sa8 
The defendant, in moving to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint, 
admitted that had the infant been alive, a violation of his rights 
under the relevant New York Civil Rights statutess7 would have 
been committed.sas The defendant argued that this type of cause 
of action is extinguished at death, that no such right can be raised 
where the photograph of a deceased person is used, and that the 
plaintiffs therefore could not raise a statutory cause of action.'ag 
The trial court agreed and the appellate panel of the Second De- 
partment The appellate court also found no merit in 
the plaintiffs causes of action for prima facie tort and intentional 
infliction of mental distress.ss1 
What are we to make of such a case? The existing case law 
does bar a cause of action under the civil rights statutes where the 
commercial use is of the the name or likeness of a dead person.s8a 
How can such behavior be not only unsanctionable, but implicitly 
recognized as lawful as the court in Smith has done? The competi- 
tion among hospitals today, including teaching institutions such as 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
325. See id. at 555, 499 N.Y.S.2d at  168-69. 
326. See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
327. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW 8 50. 
328. See Smith, 118 A.D.2d at 554,499 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
329. See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 167. 
330. See id. at 555, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 169. 
331. See id. 
332. See, e.g., Schuman v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct ,  N.Y. Co. 1955); Rob- 
ertson v. Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
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Long Island Jewish, has reached unprecedented proportions. The 
hospitals take out weekly emotional ad~e r t i s emen t s~~~  or produce 
large and professionally impressive glossy supplements to Sunday 
newspapers such as the New York Times.334 Surely there are many 
people who will gladly, either gratuitously or for compensation, 
consent to photographs of themselves or their children appearing 
in these advertisements, the sole purpose of which are to attract 
new and more patients. 
Smith demonstrates the type of harm that has been allowed to 
go unchecked because New York's courts have not expanded the 
tort of negligent infliction of mental distress to match the variety 
of conditions which regularly arise and merit common law treat- 
ment. Measuring the facts of the case by a negligence standard, it 
would not have been difficult for the Smiths to establish a prima 
facie demonstration that the defendant failed to adhere to a rea- 
sonable standard of care once the duty to exercise such care was 
acknowledged. No one will question the anguish of the parents. 
The result in Smith should encourage New York jurists, and espe- 
cially the members of the Court of Appeals, to reconsider the issue 
of broadening the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The common law tradition provides a rich heritage for recognizing 
the need for contemporary and continuing adaptation. 
In another civil rights statutory action involving the use of the 
name of a deceased person, Justice Salman, Supreme Court, 
Bronx, dismissed an Article 78 petition.ss6 In contrast to 
in Antonetty v. Cuom0,9~~ the husband, daughter and son of a de- 
ceased woman objected to the renaming of a three acre Bronx site 
333. St. Vincent's Hospital in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan, for some 
months, has been running a human interest advertisement in the Wednesday edition of The 
New York Times. Each "story" tells of some aspect of the hospital's operations and while 
not every medical case ends with a happy and full recovery, each advertisement stresses the 
caring aspect of all of St. Vincent's staff members. While such advertisements are not in 
themselves objectionable, the economic factors underlying these campaigns indicate both 
the emergence of policy choice issues with regard to health care provisions and possible new 
tort liability based on commercial advertising. These advertising institutions may be offer- 
ing, in some instances, more than they can deliver. 
334. The defendant hospital in this case prepared a supplement to The New York 
Times Sunday edition to announce many of its services and special facilities. 
335. See Antonetty v. Cuomo, 131 Misc. 2d 1041,502 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 
1986). 
336. See Smith, 118 A.D.2d a t  553, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t  167. 
337. 131 Misc. 2d 1041, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902. 
Heinonline - -  38 Syracuse L. Rev. 587 1987-1988 
588 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 38545 
from "Fordham Plaza" to "Evelina Antonetty Mall and Park."338 
It  is not clear from Justice Salman's opinion-perhaps it was not 
clear to him-why these relatives objected to the naming of a site 
in honor of a woman who apparently was an outstanding commu- 
nity leader.33B What is clear is that the civil rights statutes do not, 
as covered in the prior discussion of the Smith case, afford a cause 
of action when the person whose privacy is allegedly invaded is 
dead.s40 It  is also clear that by no rational interpretation could the 
action of the State of New York, through the Urban Development 
Corporation, be viewed as the commercial appropriation of a name 
or likeness as statutorily required.341 
In another civil rights privacy case, the Appellate Division, 
First Department, dismissed an action brought by a transit police 
officer for invasion of The plaintiff officer alleged im- 
proper production of records relating to an incident in which the 
officer had shot the owner of an antiques store.34s In Simpson v. 
New York City Transit Authority:" the court found that the rele- 
vant statute, section 50-a of the New York Civil Rights does 
make "police personnel records confidential and requires either the 
written consent of the officer involved or a court order before any 
such records may be released to a third party."346 The court then 
found that the legislative history of this statute reflected a desire 
"to curb abusive use of a police officer's personnel record in con- 
nection with such officer's appearance as a witness."s47 The court 
found that the Legislature did not intend to create, through this 
statute, a private right of action and none exists.s48 In dismissing 
Simpson's action, the court also found no merit in his claim of a 
violation of his federally guaranteed civil rights.s4g 
338. See id. a t  1044, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  903. 
339. See id. a t  1043, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  903-04. 
340. See id. a t  1046, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  906. 
341. See id. a t  1045, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t  905. 
342. 112 A.D.2d 89, 491 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1985). 
343. See id. a t  89-90, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  646. 
344. See id. a t  89, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  645. 
345. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW $ 50-a (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). 
346. See Simpson, 112 A.D.2d a t  89, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  646. 
347. See id. a t  90, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t  647. 
348. See id. 
349. The court correctly noted that an allegation of a single incident of alleged depriva- 
tion of rights guaranteed under title 42 of United States Code section 1983 was insufficient 
to properly state a claim based on that statute. 
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To finish this year's discussion of invasion of privacy on the 
lighter side, the Appellate Division, First Department's treatment 
of Creel v. Crown Publishers, is discussed. Plaintiffs ap- 
peared nude in a photograph in a 1983 book, World Guide to Nude 
Beaches and R e c r e a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  The plaintiffs alleged that their photo- 
graphs appeared without their permission.362 
In a memorandum decision, the appellate bench found that 
the cause of action was barred by the public interest classification 
of the subject material of the book.353 The court held that this clas- 
sification included the photograph of the plaintiffs gambling in the 
bufF in St. Maarten.364 "A guide to beaches where nude bathing is 
permitted is a matter of some public interest and the use of photo- 
graphs with the text is protected by constitutional safeguards and 
is outside the protection of the Civil Rights Law."355 
B. Libel and Slander 
The discussion of libel and slander cases decided during the 
Survey year is begun with the most poorly reasoned decision of the 
year. In Dally u. Orange County  publication^,^^^ the Appellate Di- 
vision, Second Department, reversed the trial court's denial of 
summary judgment for the defendant newspaper, and dismissed 
the plaintiff's action.367 The plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, was the sub- 
ject of an unauthorized advertisement in the personals section of 
the defendant's Classified Market Guide.368 The advertisement 
listed "plaintiff's first name and telephone number as the person to 
contact for further information regarding the meetings of a 
Monroe chapter of the 'Gay Community Center.' "359 
In addition, a similar advertisement concerning the plaintiff 
350. 115 A.D.2d 414, 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1985). 
351. See id. This book is a professionally-produced guide to nude beaches. Its produc- 
tion values are high and it is clearly intended for a serious readership either already com- 
mitted to nude recreation or considering the possibility. The book in no way seeks to exploit 
sexuality. Even if permission were not obtained from a subject of a photograph, i t  is difficult 
to see what rights would be violated if the photographs were taken in a public place. 
352. See id. 
353. See id. a t  415-16, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t  220-21. 
354. See id. a t  416, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t  220. 
355. Id. a t  415-16, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t  220. 
356. 117 A.D.2d 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1986). 
357. See id. 
358. See id. 
359. Id. at 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t  947-48. 
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had been published by the defendant one-and-a-half years ear- 
lier.360 As a result of the prior incident involving the plaintiff, the 
publisher had instituted a telephonic verification of advertisements 
"of a sensitive nature."s61 It is clear that this procedure was not 
used when the second advertisement, purportedly originating with 
the plaintiff, was placed.362 
The court begins its analysis by stating: 
If the plaintiff in a defamation action against a newspaper is a 
public official and the defamation relates to his official conduct, 
the plaintiff must establish actual malice, i.e., that the defama- 
tory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with 
reckless disregard of the truth, before he may recover damages 
. . . .  
98s 
Applying the New York Times v. Sullivans64 standard, the court 
assumed that because a deputy sheriff may be a public official, a 
deputy sheriff appearing in a libel action as a plaintiff is also con- 
sidered to be a public official and must prove actual malice in or- 
der to prevail.366 
The New York Times standard was articulated in order to 
protect the press when its news, and even feature, stories contain 
defamatory falsehoods.366 Virtually all cases which correctly apply 
the New York Times standard concern material generated by the 
staff of a defendant media organization and published as either 
news or a news-related feature. The personals column of a newspa- 
per cannot by any logical analysis be considered news or a news- 
related feature. There is absolutely nothing newsworthy about the 
modern personals column. All the advertisements in a personals 
column, whether published for consideration or as a free service, 
are authored by persons not under the control of the news and 
advertising staff. The assumption is that individuals write and 
place their own advertisements but the obvious scope of potential 
abuse has led most newspapers and magazines which accept such 
notices to adopt some verification procedure. 
360. See id. at 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
361. See id. 
362. See id. at 578, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
363. Id. 
364. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
365. See Dally, 117 A.D.2d at 578, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
366. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. 
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It should also seem obvious that Dally's status as a deputy 
sheriff is irrelevant here. The item was placed in the defendant's 
column undoubtedly with the intent to cause embarrassment to 
Dally. There is no newsworthy component whatsoever in this 
spurious advertisement. A deputy sheriff is not so high an official 
that he or she carries the status of public official into every facet of 
personal life and no case law has so held. 
The plaintiff in Dally was unable to prove actual malice 
against the defendant.s67 Actual malice is one of the most difficult 
burdens of proof for a plaintiff to meet and the New York Times 
formulation undoubtedly deters and derails many actions. The 
New York Times standard was never intended to cloak slothful, 
ordinary negligence in the publishing of reader-generated 
advertisements. 
A number of cases involving the media were decided during 
the Survey year. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, re- 
versed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in Fitzger- 
ald u. Herald The court found that a factual issue existed as 
to the degree of negligence of a reporter who erroneously described 
the plaintiff as having been arrested a t  a DWI  heckp point?^^ 
In Ocean State Seafood u. Capital Newspaper,s70 the Appel- 
late Division, Third Department, sustained the trial court's denial 
of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant newspaper.371 
An article in the defendant's newspaper had reported on illness 
caused by fresh seafood and suggested that avarice and greed un- 
derlay the decision to sell possibly contaminated seafood.s72 The 
Third Department found that there was sufEcient evidence offered 
by the plaintiff to raise a material issue of fact for trial?73 
Another media case concerned a diversity action which alleged 
both common law libel and a violation of New York Civil Rights 
Law.a74 Specifically, the case concerned the issue of commercial ap- 
propriation of a name or likeness without permission.375 In Nelson 
367. See Dally, 117 A.D.2d at 579, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 949. 
368. 119 A.D.2d 974, 500 N.Y.S.2d 871 (4th Dep't 1986). 
369. See id. 
370. 112 A.D.2d 662, 492 N.Y.S.2d 175 (3d Dep't 1985). 
371. See id. at 666, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 179. 
372. See id. at 663-64, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 177. 
373. See id. at 665,492 N.Y.S.2d at 178. 
374. See Nelson v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
375. See id. 
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u. Globe International, the plaintiff Nelson, an employee of 
the New York Bureau of Nutrition, was described in defendant's 
publication as being "instrumental in preparing this marshmallow- 
based diet to help GLOBE readers lose up to a pound a day."377 
The plaintiff was not pleased.378 
While the Bureau of Nutrition which employed Nelson is a 
public agency, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found that Nelson was not a public official 
within the meaning of New York Times u. Sullivan.s7s The court 
also found that Nelson was not a "limited purpose" public 
figure.380 
The real problem with the plaintiffs case is that the author of 
the article to which she objected was a free-lance journali~t.~~' 
Under New York law, the journalist had the status of an indepen- 
dent contractor and the facts show that the defendant in no way 
controlled or directed the journalist's activities.382 Thus, Nelson's 
action against the defendant failed.38s 
Another action also alleged a combination of libel and a viola- 
tion of section 51 of New York Civil Rights Law.384 Quezada By 
DeLamota v. Daily News,S8s was discussed in last year's Survey,S88 
and was reviewed by the Appellate Division, First Department, 
during the current Survey year.387 This action was based upon an 
article in the defendant's newspaper about juvenile drug traffick- 
ing.388 To accompany the article, a free-lance artist was told to 
draw a picture of children engaged in drug sales.38s The plaintiffs 
alleged that they were recognizable in the published drawing.ss0 
376. See id. 
377. See id. at 971. 
378. See id. 
379. 376 U.S. 254. 
380. See Nelson, 626 F. Supp. at 975-76. 
381. See id. at 977-78. 
382. See id. at 978-79. 
383. See id. at 978. 
384. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS LAW 3 51. 
385. 130 Misc. 2d 842, 501 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1st Dep't 1986). 
386. See Torts, 1984 Survey, supra note 3, at 673-76. 
387. See Quezada, 130 Misc. 2d at 842, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 971. 
388. See id. 
389. See id. at 844, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973. 
390. See id. at 843, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973. 
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The plaintiffs were not involved in drug deals in any manner.391 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on the libel causes of action but permitted the privacy 
causes of action to stand.392 In a per curium opinion, the First De- 
partment held that the matters covered in the article were of pub- 
lic concern and thus the plaintiffs were obliged to demonstrate 
gross irrespon~ibility.~~~ It is obvious that this standard of proof 
was difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiffs to meet because 
the artist was a free-lance contract~r.~~' 
The court refused to apply a different standard for analyzing 
the statutory invasion of privacy cause of acti0n.9~~ The court 
noted: 
Given the close connection between privacy and defamation 
claims, particularly in the area of first amendment concerns, it is 
clear that a heightened degree of fault must be shown before sec- 
tion 51 sanctions can be imposed against a media defendant for a 
publication about a newsworthy event or a matter of public inter- 
es t .  . . . SO6 
In another libel action, the Second Department found that to 
say that a lawyer "went crazy" when certain aspects of a real estate 
transaction were not completed did not constitute words sufficient 
to support a libel action.387 In O'Brien v. L e r r n ~ n , 5 ~ ~  the appellate 
division reversed the trial court and held that the words com- 
plained of "cannot reasonably be understood by the mind of the 
ordinary intelligent reader as imputing to plaintiff insanity or 
mental instability . . . . ,9388 
The importance of privilege as a bar to defamation actions was 
reflected in the three following cases decided during the Survey 
year. In Kaplan u. MacNamara,'OO the Appellate Division, Second 
391. See id. 
392. See id. 
393. See id. at 845, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74. 
394. The record demonstrates, as summarized by the court, that the illustrator was spe- 
cifically told not to draw recognizable people. See id. at 844, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74. This 
fact alone probably defeats any theory of gross irresponsibility. 
395. See id. at 846, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 975. 
396. Id. at 847, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 975. 
397. See O'Brien v. Lerman, 117 A.D.2d 658, 498 N.Y.S.2d 395 (2d Dep't 1986). 
398. Id. 
399. See id. at 659, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 396. 
400. 116 A.D.2d 626, 497 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 1986). 
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Department, affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.401 
The plaintiff, a former university faculty member, alleged defama- 
tion in the course of a tenure evaluati~n. '~~ The plaintiff failed to 
meet his burden to show the degree of personal malice that would 
strip away the qualified privilege normally protecting communica- 
tions generated in the course of a tenure review.'OS Tenure denials 
breed much bitterness and not an insignificant amount of litiga- 
tion. If the tenure process is to be based on forthright and open 
evaluations, the qualified privilege must be sustained as the Sec- 
ond Department recognized. 
The Appellate Division, Second Department, also affirmed 
summary judgment for the defendant in Mock v. LaGuardia Hos- 
pital-HIP Hospital, Inc.'04 This libel action arose from an attempt 
by plaintiffs to organize a union a t  the defendant hospital.'05 The 
plaintiffs were supervisory personnel and the defendant discharged 
them for impermissible labor a~tivity.'~ The alleged libel consisted 
of statements made by the defendant to the National Labor Rela- 
tions Board in connection with the dispute.'07 The court found 
that a qualified privilege was clearly controlling in this case.'08 
In Jafar v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,'OS a complaint was dis- 
missed upon a finding of law that an absolute privilege appliedFO 
The plaintiff-physician, who was under investigation for allegedly 
overcharging medicare patients, brought an action against a fellow 
doctor who testified to the plaintiffs detriment at an investigation 
hearing.'ll While the court found that the statements made by Dr. 
Segal, a defendant, were biased and "inexcusable;" the court con- 
cluded that the nature of the hearing mandated the application of 
the absolute immunity rule."% 
Jafar demonstrates again that the price of encouraging open 
and useful disclosures a t  quasi-judicial hearings may well be the 
401. See id. at 628,497 N.Y.S.2d at 712. 
402. See id. at 626-27, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 711. 
403. See id. at 628,497 N.Y.S.2d at 712. 
404. 117 A.D.2d 721,498 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1986). 
405. See id. at 722, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 447. 
406. See id. 
407. See id. 
408. See id. 
409. 129 Misc. 2d 584, 493 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985). 
410. See id. at 585, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 942. 
411. See id. 
412. See id. at 588-89, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 945. 
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tolerance of occasional unhelpful and malevolent abuse of the im- 
munity which attends testifying a t  such hearings.'13 
Extravagant claims by car salespersons occasiondy produce 
consumer litigation. McMilliam v. Atlantic Oldsmobile, Ltd."' 
may be the first reported case in which plaintiffs successfully al- 
leged slander per se against a salesperson employed by the defend- 
ant.'16 The plaintiffs, apparently married, wanted to buy a car and 
the credit transaction that they sought to conclude was only avail- 
able to married  couple^."^ The salesperson, defendant Levine, ap- 
parently put the requirement of marriage, a credit requirement, 
before his desire to sell the plaintiffs a car.'17 He stated, in the 
hearing of a third person, "I don't believe you are really married to 
each other . . . . You are trying to pull a fast The Appellate 
Division, Second Department, found that Levine's words impute 
the commission of a crime to the plaintiffs and are thus 
actionableYS 
In Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, N.A.,'20 the Court of Ap- 
peals sustained a jury award based on a finding that the plaintiff 
had been slandered and the trial court's striking of an award by 
the jury of punitive damages.'21 The plaintiff-employee was fired 
after being informed in a meeting that he was dealing in illicit 
drugs and that he had misappropriated bank property.'22 The 
Court held that the jury award of punitive damages was unwar- 
ranted because the plaintiff was unable to establish the involve- 
ment of the employer in the slanderous statements made by its 
employee.423 
C. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts 
Virtually every case in which a plaintiff attempts to sustain a 
cause of action for prima facie tort reflects the courts' extreme re- 
413. See id. 
414. 115 A.D.2d 645, 496 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2d Dep't 1985). 
415. See id. at 645-46, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482. 
416. See id. at 645, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482. 
417. See id. 
418. Id. 
419. See id. at 645-46, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482. 
420. 67 N.Y.2d 369, 494 N.E.2d 70, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1986). 
421. See id. at 381, 494 N.E.2d at 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 972. 
422. See id. at 373-74, 494 N.E.2d at 72, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
423. See id. at 377, 494 N.E.2d at 74-75, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 969-70. 
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luctance to recognize that tort. The Appellate Division, First De- 
partment, in Halperin v. Sal~an,'~' found that an amended com- 
plaint sufficiently alleged a prima facie tort cause of action.4z5 This 
action was brought by an attorney against several defendants for 
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against an 
attorney defendant on the theory of prima facie tort as well.'46 The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had initiated, with malice and 
with no lawful purpose, a lawsuit for the sole purpose of injuring 
the plaintiff professi~nally.~~~ Thus, the elements of the prima fa- 
cie tort cause of action were found to be adequately pleaded.(48 
In view of the fact that the plaintiff may have problems dem- 
onstrating the requisite degree of mental distress necessary for his 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action-a prob- 
lem common to most litigants who raise this tort action-the 
court's recognition of the facial merits of his pleading was a real 
advantage to him. 
While reported tort assault and battery actions are somewhat 
uncommon today, two such decisions were handed down during 
the Survey year. The Appellate Division, Third Department, in 
O'Reilly v. Executone of Albany, I ~C . , ' ~~  sustained the sufficiency 
of a complaint which alleged battery as well as intentional inflic- 
tion of emotional distress in the context of sexual haras~ment.'~~ It  
is clear from the brief opinion of the court that the type of conduct 
which plaintiff alleged is of the variety not physically harmful, but 
that is nonetheless offensive and unwelcome.4s1 Because battery is 
completed when there is an unwanted, intentional offensive physi- 
cal contact not justified by law, attorneys should consider includ- 
ing a cause of action for this tort in all sexual harassment actions 
where there has been any touching. The very term, "battery," has 
a certain emotional import, and proving a cause of action in bat- 
tery may help to convey to a jury the totality of wrongfulness in- 
herent in the sexual harassment incident. 
424. 117 A.D.2d 544, 499 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1986). 
425. See id. at 546, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 57-58. 
426. See id. at 545, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 57. 
427. See id. at 546-47, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 58. 
428. See id. 
429. 121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185 (3d Dep't 1986). 
430. See id. at 774, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 186. 
431. See id. at 773, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 185-86. 
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In Rodriguez v. J o h n s ~ n , ' ~ ~  the plaintiff charged that the de- 
fendant Janet Johnson, a bus matron, was liable for slapping her 
child.433 Both plaintiff and defendant appeared pro se in the Small 
Claims Part of the Civil Court of the City of New Y01-k.'~' Judge 
Taylor found that no condition existed to justify the application of 
force by the defendant to the plaintiffs She found for the 
plaintiff in the sum of $250.00.'36 Her well-reasoned opinion ends 
with her observation: 
I t  is time for the civil law to recognize that children are entitled 
to equal protection. The tort of battery, which once protected 
only the bodily integrity of men, must now protect all persons, be 
they adults or children, from unauthorized physical contact. 
Physical abuse in even the slightest degree seriously harms chil- 
dren. It is not only immoral and unethical, but also unfair and 
unjust and therefore intrinsically illegal. I t  is most appropriate to 
consider such abuse as the tort of battery.'37 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The impact of the new legislative enactments designed to alle- 
viate the malpractice situation should become assessable during 
the next year. Whether these new laws provide some relief for the 
medical community, the fact remains that medical malpractice is a 
reality which begins, more often than not, in a medical not a legal 
setting. Tort law must continue to find remedies for the victims of 
medical malpractice as it must continue to be the source of justice 
and recovery for all who sustain harm because of civil wrongs. Per- 
haps the single greatest impression received from reviewing the 
case law advance sheets each year in preparing this Article is the 
continued vitality and relevance of our common law system and, 
aberrant, poorly reasoned and silly decisions aside, the degree of 
wisdom expressed by our very busy jurists each year. 
432. 132 Misc. 2d 555, 504 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986). 
433. See id. at 556, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 379. 
434. See id. at 555, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 379. 
435. See id. at 556, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 379. 
436. See id. at 561, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 382. 
437. Id. at 560-61, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 382. 
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